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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Alan Watson published his short work, Legal Transplants: An
Approach to Comparative Law.1 It was written in 1970, originating in
lectures on jurisprudence given at the University of Virginia.2 The delay in
publication was due not only to lack of interest in the book from publishers,
but also because a colleague had discouraged its publication.3 Alan likes to
say that it “fell stillborn from the press.”4 Perhaps to some extent it did.5 It
certainly does not seem to have attracted many reviews. A quarter of a
century later, however, Thomas Carbonneau could describe Legal
Transplants as a “seminal” text in comparative law.6 More than a decade
after Carbonneau’s claim, a book on methods in comparative law included
“Legal Transplants” as providing one of the standard methodological
approaches to the discipline, devoting to it a “Part” described as “Legal
Transplants and Transnational Codes: Questioning on Cultural Biases and
Scientific Statements.”7 The author of one of the chapters described Legal
Transplants as a “magisterial book.”8 Other chapters also routinely used
Alan’s work as a reference.9 But by 2012, the date of publication of this
book, Legal Transplants had already long come in from the cold; or, to use
Alan’s metaphor, the stillborn work had acquired life and grown up to be a
vigorous adult.

1
ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974)
[hereinafter LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.)].
2
ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW, at xi (2d ed.
1993) [hereinafter LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (2d ed.)].
3
Id. at 118 n.2.
4
A. Watson, Law and Society, in BEYOND DOGMATICS: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE ROMAN
WORLD 9 (John W. Cairns & Paul J. du Plessis eds., 2007); LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (2d ed.),
supra note 2, at 118 n.2; see also Gary Francione, Alan Watson’s Controversial Contribution
to Scholarship, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 59, 61 (2002).
5
See infra Part IV (describing scholarly reactions to LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra
note 1).
6
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Book Review, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 729 (2000) (reviewing PATRICK
GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD, SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW (1st ed. 2000)).
7
See Geoffrey Samuel, All that Heaven Allows: Are Transnational Codes a “Scientific
Truth” or Are They Just a Form of Elegant “Pastiche”?, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW
165, 169–70 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012).
8
Chen Lei, Contextualizing Legal Transplant: China and Hong Kong, in METHODS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 192.
9
Pier Giuseppe Monasteri, Methods in Comparative Law: An Intellectual Overview, in
METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 7, 19–22; Simone Glanert, Method?, in
METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 61, 62–63; Gary Watt, Comparison as Deep
Appreciation, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 82, 82–84, 87, 93–94, 96–97.
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In this Article in Alan’s honor, I shall explore the nearly forty years of
history of Legal Transplants, tracing reactions to it, until it became judged a
classic of comparative law—a “landmark book,” as Frances Foster described
it in 2010.10 She considered Alan as having made with it “a major
contribution to the field of comparative law,” one leaving “an indelible
imprint on comparative law scholarship.”11 But, of course, forty years of
scholarship have meant that debates have developed far beyond Alan’s initial
discussion and, furthermore, gone in many different and unexpected
directions. Much has recently been built on the foundations of the work,
much—one suspects—that Alan did not anticipate. Indeed, one may deduce
that an idea has been successful, and stimulated considerable work, when a
scholar could suggest in 2010 that “the study of legal transplants seems to
have reached its saturation point.”12 But there is little to suggest that this is
in fact the case. For instance, in the years since Meryll Dean subsequently
refined Alan’s transplant theory in her study of jury trial in Japan,13 and
Gilles Cuniberti commented in 2012 that “[s]ince the early work of Alan
Watson, legal transplants have become central to the study of comparative
law.”14 In the same year, Legal Transplants could once more be cited as a
“seminal book.”15 The simplest search through standard data bases shows
many more examples of continuing reliance on Alan’s work. There is life in
the idea yet.
I shall conclude this tribute, however, with an exploration of what one
might call the “prehistory” of legal transplants. This will be a brief study of
what is potentially a major topic. Examination of an earlier discussion of a
similar idea, reflecting on what was similar and what different, helps point
up the significance of Alan’s work. It also leads to reflection on why the
idea of “legal transplants” or “transplantation of laws” seems so obvious to
some scholars, while others remain skeptical. The comparison will also
throw light on the modern concept of legal transplants, reflecting on its force
as a metaphor.
10
Frances H. Foster, American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror, 94 MINN. L. REV. 602, 608,
610 (2010).
11
Id.
12
Margit Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of Unreasonableness and
Proportionality Review of the Administration in the United Kingdom, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 583,
583 (2010).
13
See generally Meryll Dean, Legal Transplants and Jury Trial in Japan, 31 LEGAL STUD.
570 (2011) (analyzing jury trial in Japan using Watson’s theory of legal transplants).
14
Gilles Cuniberti, Enhancing Judicial Reputation Through Legal Transplants: Estoppel
Travels to France, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 383 (2012).
15
Maraina Pargendler, Politics in the Origin: The Making of Corporate Law in NineteenthCentury Brazil, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 805, 806 (2012).
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II. THE EARLY HISTORY OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: THE BOOK AND ITS
FIRST CRITICS
The preface of Legal Transplants is dated Edinburgh, June 1973, and the
title page bears the date 1974.16 There is no need to rehearse the argument of
the book in detail, but it will be helpful if some of the main points are
outlined. Alan argued that the proper task of comparative law as an
academic discipline was to explore the relationship between legal systems.17
He claimed that there was no necessary and close connection between laws
and the society in which they operated.18 In fact, laws were usually
borrowed from elsewhere, so that laws often operated in societies and in
places very different from those in which they had initially developed. Laws
were often strongly rooted in the past. Transplanting of laws was easy. All
of this had major implications for our understanding of both legal history and
sociology of law. The arguments were developed through detailed historical
examples and argument.19
I have traced four reviews of Legal Transplants and one assessment in the
“Books Received” section of a law journal. An examination of these will
show the range of immediate responses to the work; moreover, it will also
demonstrate what were to become persistent and regular criticisms of Alan’s
work on legal transplants.
The first review to appear was probably that penned by Marc Ancel, a
distinguished French judge and comparative lawyer, published in a French
legal periodical early in 1975.20 Ancel described the contents of Legal
Transplants and outlined Alan’s arguments in a way that indicated he
understood them. He noted Alan’s view of that with which comparative law
should be concerned. Ancel referred to the paradoxical phenomenon that,
though law was often seen as closely related to the identity of a nation or
people, in fact transplantation of laws had been common in the ancient world
as well as in the modern. He appreciated the nature of Alan’s arguments
about transplants and the relationship between legal systems. He described
some of the insightful observations made by Alan that he found interesting.
He observed that the work raised the possibility of a unified legal system and
debated some of the issues. In his generally favourable review, he only
regretted that Alan had not developed his methodological positions further,
16

LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra note 1, at xi.
Id. at 6.
18
Id. at 21–22.
19
Id. at 21–30.
20
Marc Ancel, Book Review, 27 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 303, 303–04
(1975) (reviewing LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra note 1).
17
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commenting that this was a work that mattered in the literature on
comparative law.21 In the summer of the same year, the work was reviewed
by Charles Maechling.22 He considered Legal Transplants as attempting not
“to create an expansive new approach” but instead to bring a “sharper focus
and more rigorous analytical approach” to a field hitherto eclectic and
narrowly empirical.23 He noted that Alan would narrow the discipline to the
study of relationships between legal systems, made in a historical context.
This would be done by studying the migrations or transplants of legal rules.24
He seems to have been cautiously approving of Alan’s approach, though
noting that it depended on his particular view of what constituted
comparative law. He raised some general points of his own essentially about
problems of teaching comparative law.25 He wondered if Alan’s prescription
was perhaps too narrow, before concluding that he wished the book were
longer and that there had been a “greater wealth of historical example, and
somewhat deeper elaboration of the social, political and economic context
that must inevitably underlie his conclusions.”26
Robert B. Seidman, Professor of Law at Boston University School of
Law, reviewed Legal Transplants at some length in his school’s law
journal.27 After setting out various propositions to be deduced from the
book, he described Alan’s general “conclusions” as “either trivial or banal.”
Seidman argued that the problem was the “positivist” methodology adopted
that excluded consideration of “social variables”; the problem, he claimed,
was that social factors could not be ignored, so that when they were in fact
considered, it was “without any careful analysis or testing of hypotheses.”28
He criticized Alan’s generation of propositions about law from specific
historical instances. He concluded that the book failed because of Alan’s
“acceptance of the categories and methodology of traditional legal
scholarship.”29 An anonymous short note in April 1975 in the Stanford Law

21

Id.
Maechling was an international lawyer who had worked for the State Department, and
who also briefly taught at the University of Virginia School of Law as a visiting professor.
Patricia Sullivan, State Department Lawyer Charles Maechling, Jr., 87, WASH. POST, July 3,
2007, at B8.
23
Charles Maechling, Book Review, 15 VA. J. INT’L L. 1037, 1038 (1974–1975) (reviewing
LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra note 1).
24
Id. at 1037–38.
25
Id. at 1038–39.
26
Id. at 1039.
27
R.B. Seidman, Book Review, 55 B. U. L. REV. 682, 682–83 (1975) (reviewing LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra note 1).
28
Id. at 683.
29
Id. at 685–87.
22
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Review was also very hostile.30 It quoted Alan’s definition of legal
transplant, and the fact that Alan thought it paradoxical that transplants of
law were common when there was “a widespread notion” that law was an
indicator of a people’s identity. It noted that Alan used the idea of legal
transplant to compare a number of legal systems. It concluded:
At its best . . . the book provides some not very startling
insights into legal history that are consonant with the author’s
view that comparative law is the study of (mainly historical)
relationships between legal systems. At its worst — and too
frequently — the book falls prey to its own criticisms of
comparative law: superficiality and lack of systematization.31
Siedman’s reviews and the note in the Stanford Law Review establish
what have proved to be repeated criticisms of Alan’s work regularly made by
sociologists of law and socio-legal writers. The most important review,
however, was undoubtedly that by the distinguished labour lawyer, Otto
(later Sir Otto) Kahn-Freund, who had recently retired as Professor of
Comparative Law at Oxford.32 This is an interesting, serious, and complex
review, to which Alan responded. The debate between them then generated
further discussion.
At one level, Kahn-Freund’s review was full of praise: “this brilliant little
book”; “it provokes thought”; “an extremely interesting book”; a book
“replete with pungent and original observations.”33 But one suspects that, at
another level, Kahn-Freund may have been quite disquieted by the book, and
this, perhaps, in two ways.
First, Kahn-Freund had delivered the second Chorley Lecture at the
London School of Economics on June 26, 1973, under the title On Uses and
Misuses of Comparative Law.34 It was published in January of the next year.
There he had focused on comparative law as a tool of law reform. In this
context, he raised the questions:
What are the uses and misuses of foreign models in the process
of law making? What conditions must be fulfilled in order to
30
Book Note, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (1975) (reviewing LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st
ed.), supra note 1).
31
Id.
32
Otto Kahn-Freund, Book Review, 91 L.Q.R. 292 (1975) (reviewing LEGAL TRANSPLANTS
S (1st ed.), supra note 1).
33
See generally id.
34
Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974)
[hereinafter On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law].
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make desirable or even make it possible for those who prepare
new legislation to avail themselves of rules or institutions
developed in foreign countries?35
Kahn-Freund stated that, in the twentieth century, British legislation had
become particularly open to foreign influences. He gave as examples
commercial legislation of various types and family law. He also pointed to
examples of “the use of foreign legal patterns for the purpose of producing
rather than responding to social change at home,” commenting that “we
cannot be surprised that it is this use of foreign models as instruments of
social or cultural change which raises most sharply the problem I am
discussing — the problem of transplantation.”36
In the late 1960s and the 1970s organ transplantation and organ rejection
were common topics of discussion, particularly as the work of the
charismatic and publicity-seeking Dr. Christiaan Barnard of Cape Town
generated tremendous newspaper, radio, and television coverage, making the
terminology of transplants popular and familiar.37 Kahn-Freund alluded to
organ transplantation in his lecture, also referring to exchanging
mechanisms, such as carburetors, to develop ideas of varying transferability:
he used the metaphor to discuss a spectrum of transplantable rules from
mechanical (easy) to organic (difficult).38 He cited Montesquieu’s views of
the difficulty of transplanting (not of course Montesquieu’s term) the rules of
one country to another.39 He also referred to planting in soil; but he did not
refer to plants in the context of transplantation, though he could have, instead
alluding to a metaphor of roots and cultivation.40
One suspects that Kahn-Freund was pleased with his metaphor of
transplantation, and disappointed to find that the same metaphor was
employed at length in Alan’s book and featured in the title.41 This would be
perfectly understandable. Of course, as I have mentioned, discussion of
organ transplantation was very much in the air in the late 1960s and early

35

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2–5.
37
See, e.g., Progress on Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1969, at 2, available at http://se
lect.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50613FE38581B7493C5AB1789D95F4D8685F9.
38
On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, supra note 34, at 6–10.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 13.
41
The use of the term in this way predates both Watson and Kahn-Freund. See John W.
Cairns, Development of Comparative Law in Great Britain, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 131, 146, 150, 170–71 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
2006). This will be discussed further infra Part IV.
36
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1970s.42 That these two individuals should have come up with it as a
metaphor to express the borrowing of legal rules and institutions in a
discussion of comparative law is hardly surprising. Moreover, they were not
alone. In 1972, Jean Rivero, a French administrative lawyer, had considered
the utility of the metaphor, drawn from advanced surgery, as he put it, of
“transplant of organs,” as a means of understanding borrowing of
administrative law.43 The next year, John Beckstrom of Northwestern
University, an expert on law in Africa, published an article on western laws
in Ethiopia, using the term “transplantation,” both in the title and the text.44
While Beckstrom did not attempt to develop the term conceptually, simply
using it as a synonym for reception, it appears neither Watson nor KahnFreund were aware of this article at the time they published.
Secondly, and more seriously, Kahn-Freund would profoundly disagree
with Alan’s conclusions about the ease of transplanting rules. The whole
thrust of Legal Transplants was to argue in particular that borrowing was the
most common mode of legal development, and that it was unnecessary for
the borrowing system to have any real understanding of the system from
which rules or institutions were borrowed; moreover, Alan argued, the
longevity of rules was astonishing. He also concluded that comparative law
was properly about the study of the relationships between legal systems
forged by such borrowing. Further, from this, conclusions could be drawn
about both the nature of law and the complexity of relationship between law
and the society in which it operated. The argument is careful, nuanced, and
developed using examples; but I think the above description is not too crude
and sums it up fairly well.
Kahn-Freund, however, drawing on Montesquieu’s assertion that it would
only be “un grand hazard” that one country could ever use the law of
another, tried to develop an analysis of when borrowing could take place and
to establish its prerequisites.45 He argued that the types of environmental
factors that Montesquieu saw as discouraging transplanting were now much
less significant, but that constitutional and political factors had become much
more important.46 Kahn-Freund claimed that anyone inclined to borrow laws
42
Roy Calne, History of Transplantation, 368 THE LANCET (SPECIAL ISSUE) S51 (2006);
Thomas Schlich, The Origins of Organ Transplantation, 378 THE LANCET 1372, 1373 (2011).
43
Jean Rivero, Les phénomnènes d’imitation des modèles étrangers en droit administrative,
in 2 PAGES DE DOCTRINE 459, 459 (1980).
44
John H. Beckstrom, Transplantation of Legal Systems, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 557, 558, 582
(1973).
45
On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, supra note 34, at 6–7.
46
Both Kahn-Freund and Watson use “environmental” and “environment” in a much
broader sense, closer to their root meanings than the current contemporary uses that refer
almost exclusively to the “natural” environment. This very narrow usage had not yet become
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needed to reflect on the nature of the society that generated the borrowed
rule. Kahn-Freund concluded:
[W]e cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are
transplantable. . . . [A]ny attempt to use a pattern of law
outside the environment of its origin continues to entail the risk
of rejection. The consciousness of this risk will not, I hope,
deter legislators in this or any other country from using the
comparative method. All I have wanted to suggest is that its
use requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also
of its social, and above all its political, context. The use of
comparative law for practical purposes becomes an abuse only
if it is informed by a legalistic spirit which ignores this context
of the law.47
Alan was of course arguing for such an “abuse.”
Kahn-Freund argued in his review of Legal Transplants that “[f]rom
Professor Watson’s own analysis there emerge two entirely different types of
transplants,” commenting that it was “a pity that Professor Watson has not
made their contrast more explicit.”48 The first type, according to KahnFreund, was exemplified by the reception of rules on traditio; the second by
the reception of Roman law in Scotland, which related to the politics of
Scotland and its relationship with England in the Middle Ages.49 He
suggested that, had Watson distinguished these types of transplants, “he
might . . . have modified his analysis of the ease with which rules move from
society to society.”50 One obvious point to make is that Kahn-Freund’s
second example focused only on the borrowing system, not on the one
borrowed form, which supports Alan’s general thesis, rather than questioning
it. His first example at one level could be seen as supporting his own view of
the difficulty of transplants, and, at another, as supporting Alan’s views of
how transplants can vary. The review ended with two little teasing
observations:
And it is good to read from the pen of the Professor of Civil
Law at Edinburgh an acknowledgement that the rules of
dominant in the 1970s. By “environment” Kahn-Freund and Alan mean surrounding
circumstances.
47
On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, supra note 34, at 27.
48
Kahn-Freund, supra note 32, at 292–93.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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English and Scottish contract law are similar in practice and
that nothing prevents their unification or harmonization except
the dead hand of history and the habits of thought of academic
scholars.51
And:
This is a short book — too short. One lays it aside with a vivid
feeling of “vivant sequentes,” with a strong hope that Professor
Watson will continue to use his immense learning for the
elucidation of the methodological problems he has here
approached.52
Alan responded to Kahn-Freund in a short article published in January of
the next year.53 He explained wherein he thought his and Kahn-Freund’s
differences lay. He described his own views thus:
[S]uccessful legal borrowing could be made from a very
different legal system, even from one at a much higher level of
development and of a different political complexion. What, in
my opinion, the law reformer should be after in looking at
foreign systems was an idea which could be transformed into
part of the law of his country. For this a systematic knowledge
of the law or political structure of the donor system was not
necessary, though a law reformer with such knowledge would
be more efficient. Successful borrowing could be achieved
even when nothing was known of the political, social or
economic context of the foreign law.54
Not unfairly, he summed up those of Kahn-Freund in the following way:
[His] principal thesis is that the degree to which any rule can be
transplanted depends primarily on how closely it is linked with
the foreign power structure. He sets out his conclusion: “All I
have wanted to suggest is that its use [i.e., the comparative

51
52
53
54

Id. at 293–94 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 294.
Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L.Q.R. 79 (1976).
Id.
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method] requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but
also of its social, and above all its political context.”55
Alan pointed out that “Montesquieu badly — very badly — underestimated
the amount of successful borrowing which had been going on, and was going
on, in his day.”56 He added:
[T]he Reception [of Roman law] shows that legal rules may be
successfully borrowed where the relevant social, economic,
geographical and political circumstances of the recipient are
very different from those of the donor system. Indeed, the
recipient system does not require any real knowledge of the
social, economic, geographical and political context of the
origin and growth of the original rule. . . .
[W]here a rule of Roman law was inimical to the political,
social [sic: “geographical” intended?], economic or social
circumstances of a later state, its chances of being borrowed by
that later state would be greatly diminished. But this reduced
possibility of being borrowed existed . . . usually only when the
rule was inimical and not also when the Roman context of the
rule was simply different from the circumstances prevailing in
the later state. . . . [O]ne might deduce the proposition:
“However historically conditioned their origins might be, rules
of private law in their continuing lifetime have no inherent
close relationship with a particular people, time or place.”57
Alan emphasized that his disagreement with Kahn-Freund was with the
latter’s view that “the degree to which any rule can be borrowed depends on
how closely it is linked with the foreign power structure and that the use of
the comparative method requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law but
also of its political context.”58 He emphasized that the focus in borrowing
should be on the system doing the borrowing.59 He stated that he was “not
entirely persuaded by the opinion that environmental factors are now less
important, political factors more important, in determining difficulties for a

55

Id. at 79–80 (quoting On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, supra note 34, at 27).
Id. at 80.
57
Id. at 80–81 (quoting On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, supra note 34, at 2).
58
Id. at 82.
59
See id. (explaining that looking at Irish power structure would predict the failure of
English-style divorce law in Ireland).
56
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legal transplant.”60 He further argued that general laws in large and diverse
modern states may be more easily transplantable than those of the small
jurisdictions with which Montesquieu was familiar.61
There was no further response from Kahn-Freund. While he was not to
die until 1979, and remained active as a scholar, he did not return to the
topic.62 The debate was picked up in 1977, however, by Professor Eric Stein
of the Law School of the University of Michigan in an article honoring a
colleague, A. Brunson MacChesnay, who was retiring from the Law School
of Northwestern University.63 Stein summed up the views of the two
scholars quite fairly. He drew a distinction between them, classifying the
approach of Kahn-Freund as that of “a Lawyer-Sociologist” and that of Alan
as that of a “Legal Historian.”64 In drawing this distinction, Stein wished to
emphasize that Alan tended to take a “macro-legal” view, contemplating “the
massive transplants that loom as milestones on the large-scale canvas of
world history,” while Kahn-Freund adopted a “micro-legal” view,
concentrating on modern law reform.65 He was evidently not inclined to
accept the accuracy of Alan’s perception that transplants were easy: he gave
as an example the attempts of modern industrial states to reform their
company laws, focusing on Germany and France in the (then) European
Economic Community. He also suggested that what may appear to be
transplants may be examples of parallel developments.66 He raised some
appropriate questions about the definitions of “environmental” and
“political” factors, and questioned how realistic would be the vision of the
reformer “on a tour d’horizon of foreign legal systems plucking ideas from
‘black letter’ rules in complete ignorance of how such rules came to operate
as ‘living law’ and where they fit into the legal system.”67 He claimed that
Kahn-Freund had shown that, had British legislators examined how
collective bargaining worked in the U.S.A., they might have realized that
transplanting certain American concepts into British law would lead to their
rejection.68 This example, however, is in many ways as much in favor of
60

Id. at 83.
Id. at 83–84.
62
W. [Lord Wedderburn of Charlton], Professor Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, 42 MOD. L. REV.
609 (1979). For a list of his publications, see Schriftenverzeichnis–Bibliography, in IN
MEMORIAM SIR OTTO KAHN-FREUND 783 (Franz Gamillscheg et al. eds., 1980).
63
Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses-and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 198
(1977).
64
Id. at 199–203.
65
Id. at 203–04.
66
Id. at 204–07.
67
Id. at 207–09.
68
Id. at 208–09.
61
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Alan’s as Kahn-Freund’s opinion. Stein also wondered how much Turkish
and Japanese borrowers knew about the systems from which they borrowed,
concluding that: “It may well be that where the law maker lacks private or
governmental institutional arrangements for a systematic use of the
comparative method, his way of drawing on foreign law, if he considers it at
all, corresponds to Watson’s idea.”69 He concluded by questioning how
common was the use of the comparative method in law reform, giving as
instances practices in the United States, while ending with an emphasis on
the significance of comparative studies for legal education.70

III. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT: SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE
In the same year as Stein’s article appeared, Alan published Society and
Legal Change, in which he further developed his ideas about the longevity of
legal rules.71 In the preface, dated April 1976, he noted that Kahn-Freund
had read a draft and discussed it with him.72 Alan’s general thrust was that
laws in the West were generally out-of-step with the needs and desires of
society because of a general inertia. He argued that this showed that most
current theories of law and society were implausible and that private law
rules played little part in promoting the health and well-being of society.73
Alan developed this argument through discussions of Roman law (notably of
contracts and patria potestas), English real property, and libel and slander in
England, before reflecting on what he described as “legal scaffolding”
(elaborate systems of modification to support existing rules and make them
workable), legal transplants, and divergence. In a chapter of conclusions he
emphasized the implausibility of most current theories of law and society,
and once more emphasized the general lack of a direct link between law and
the society it served. He concluded with some remarks about the
significance of codification as raising questions about whether it can abolish
legal scaffolding and remove legal divergence.74
In a final chapter he set out two possible approaches to studying the
causes of legal development. The first was to study a country’s laws during
a period when it underwent rapid change. The second would be to study the
69
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relationship through borrowing between legal systems. He gave as a brief
example the development of law out of the Roman actio de pauperie.75 He
pointed out:
Every time a change is deliberately made a choice has been
exercised. Often the retention of a legal rule is also the result
of choice. To isolate the factors in the choices which are made
is to go a long way towards understanding how law develops
and also how law is in fact related to its society. . . . Yet the
lesson of the preceding chapters is precisely that in explaining
legal development the isolation of factors such as those just
listed is in general not enough. That can tell us why the
particular development occurred, and not some other; but it
does not explain why development occurred at all, or at that
precise time. For that we must search for the impetus which
was strong enough to overcome the law’s inertia.76
The reviews were uniformly unfavorable. J.N. (John) Adams, an
English property lawyer and legal historian, described the work’s
“fundamental weakness” as attempting “to make a sociological thesis
without using a sociologist’s methodology,” which he described as “a trap
into which it is all too easy for a historian to fall.”77 He distinguished
sociology from history, using the example of the work of Max Weber, and
argued that Alan attempted “to generalise from [some sequences of historical
events] a sociological theory. It does not work.”78 He suggested that Alan
had misused a variety of sociological concepts in an atheoretical way,
concluding that “[w]hen it is all boiled down, the defensible parts of the
thesis of Society and Legal Change amount to very little.”79 He softened this
at the end, writing that, “as a work of history, this book is stimulating,
amusing, and sometimes brilliant . . . . It is not however an important
contribution to the sociological study of law and society.”80
Lawrence Friedman of the Stanford Law School also reviewed the book.81
A well-known sociologist of law as well as historian of American law,
75
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Friedman was in many ways an obvious choice as a reviewer, since he was
noted for his treatment of American law as closely related to American
society.82 In the preface to the first edition (1973) of his History of American
Law, he had written:
This is a social history of American law. I have tried to fight
free of jargon, legal and sociological, but I have surrendered
myself wholeheartedly to some of the central insights of social
science. This book treats American law, then, not as a
kingdom unto itself, not as a set of rules and concepts, not as
the province of lawyers alone, but as a mirror of society. It
takes nothing as historical accident, nothing as autonomous,
everything as relative and molded by economy and society.83
This was apparently as far from Alan’s approach as one could get. Further,
in Society and Legal Change, Alan had even stated explicitly that his theory
was directly in conflict with that of Friedman.84
Friedman’s review of the book is, indeed, as one would have anticipated.
He states that the book “sets forth a single, rather simple thesis,” namely that
“law can be and often is seriously out of phase with society.”85 This meant it
“casts doubt on theories which suggest some kind of close organic
connection between law and society. This puts Watson in opposition to most
sociologists of law, and indeed to most current theorists of law.”86 The book,
he noted, was largely made up of examples to prove the thesis. He
commented: “To be blunt, I find the thesis quite unconvincing.”87 He
suggested that Alan focused on trivial or fringe issues that no one bothered
about. Friedman made some good points, suggesting, for example, that the
reason the law ended up irrational and muddled was because it was “subject
to conflicting social and economic pressures,” with which Alan would
82
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probably have agreed.88 He criticized Alan as having a rather narrow notion
of law. He agreed that laws were borrowed, but that choice was often
involved (which Alan would not have denied). Friedman finished with an
attack on academic lawyers who tended, he thought, to focus on peripheral or
freak topics. His attitude can readily be gathered by the metaphor he used:
The book, in my opinion, is fundamentally wrong: yet the error
is quite understandable.
If a person spends his life
embroidering and decorating some little swatch of material, it
is no use telling him he has wasted his time on a useless rag.
The business of academic lawyers revolves about the minute
dissection of rules only remotely connected with living,
breathing law. These rules are found in the “general part” of
the codes, or (in the common-law world) are often generalized
from rare and wholly peripheral lawsuits, arising out of freak
circumstances.89
Friedman’s classification of academic law—and perhaps indeed, given his
following paragraph about the actio de pauperie, especially of Roman law—
as a kind of glass bead game, indicates his stance.
Aubrey L. Diamond, whose special field was consumer credit and hire
purchase, was another reviewer, chosen no doubt because of his academic
focus on a “practical” and contemporary field and his work as a member of
the English Law Commission.90 He was also Director of the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies in London. After a general description of the
contents of the book, Diamond asked: “How far do the examples given by
Professor Watson support his proposition that the law has been much out of
step with society?”91 He replied: “I would find it easier to answer that
question if I knew what it meant to say that law is out of step with society.”92
He commented: “[I]t seems an unduly pretentious phrase to describe some of
the defects in English or Roman law given by the author.”93 Like Friedman,
he criticized Alan’s focus on detail. To make sense, he argued, it would need
to be “pitched at the level of . . . broad constitutional or political issues.”94
But he conceded much more to Alan than Friedman had. He thought that if
88
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all that Alan meant was that the law is imperfect, then “his case is more
persuasive.”95 He added:
This book supports the views expressed in Legal Transplants
(1974) and to some extent overlaps the earlier work. If the
laws of one country can be adopted by another, it becomes
difficult to argue that, for the adopting country at any rate, law
arises from the common consciousness of the people. Would it
make any substantial difference to the life of the man in the
street if the whole of English law concerned with contracts,
commerce, torts and property were replaced overnight by that
of France or Germany?96
As late as 1982, Society and Legal Change rated a twenty-four page
review essay by Richard Abel, a noted “law and society” scholar at
U.C.L.A., much of whose work has focused on the legal profession and the
provision of legal services.97 Abel commented that Alan had “built upon his
vast knowledge of legal history to offer a social theory of law.”98 He
suggested that Alan’s concept of law was vague and confused and that his
“conception of society [was] even more problematic.”99 He claimed that
Alan rejected “the study of legal institutions and processes in order to
concentrate upon substantive rules, and he personifies society so as to render
unnecessary any analysis of the political ideas or behaviour of particular
individuals or groups.”100 Abel also attacked Alan’s “antitheoretical stance,”
on the basis of which he considered Alan criticized three types of social
theories. He judged that Alan showed what connects them: the assumption
that “harmony between law and society is natural and attainable.”101 But he
claimed that Alan caricatured each theory in order to “expose their common
error.”102 He argued that, “in reacting against the prevailing theoretical
framework, Watson has not escaped it but merely turned it upside down,”
and that his own position “is a mirror image of the functionalism he
attacks.”103 He suggested that Alan seemed to be “an unconfessed
95
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utilitarian.”104 He saw part of the problem also lying in the restricted scope
of Alan’s investigations.105
Abel concluded with an attack on Alan’s politics (as he deduced them
from what he perceived to be Alan’s social theory). He claimed of Alan’s
account of law: “What is singularly lacking in his view is any notion that law
ought to lead society, ought to be an instrument for radical change, from
which I in infer that he opposes such change.”106 The inference, of course,
does not follow; but I think this explains why Abel reviewed this work in this
fashion so many years after its publication. In the very year Society and
Legal Change was published, Abel had been one of the founders of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies.107 The quotation from Abel sums up
much of what united the disparate groups that made up this very selfconscious and self-important movement.108 By 1982, Alan was in the
U.S.A., teaching at the prestigious Law School of the University of
Pennsylvania, and the Critical Legal Studies movement was approaching its
height. Abel and others who identified with Critical Legal Studies will have
sensed that Alan’s scholarship was not sympathetic to their views and
political aims. Abel’s review in many ways seems to adopt the technique of
“trashing,” as it was called, ferreting out and exposing the “contradictions”
supposedly in Alan’s theoretical approach. It was a technique much favored
by scholars who identified with Critical Legal Studies.109 On the basis of
this, he described Alan as having a “basically conservative world view.”110
According to Abel, this was connected with Watson’s “apolitical
interpretation.” Indeed, “[t]hose who have denied the existence of pattern
and necessity in history . . . have been political conservatives seeking to
confute radicals, notably Marx and later Marxists, who maintain that
historical trends do exist and should be used to further progressive
causes.”111 At the end of the review, Abel appears to return to a more
traditional social science critique, analogous to those of Society and Legal
Change that had already appeared. He wrote: “Recent social studies of law
are impoverished by their parochial focus on contemporary legal institutions
within a single country. Our theories could be enormously enriched by
104
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comparative and historical scholarship. But that scholarship must meet the
canons of contemporary social science.”112 But the agenda of Critical Legal
Studies was further revealed when Abel wrote:
The starting point must be a statement of values, for the
scholar’s vision of the good society influences not only what he
deems worthy of study but also the kind of explanations he will
entertain. Some epistemological position must also be chosen
and adhered to rigorously. . . . These preliminary decisions will
largely determine the theory of society with which the
investigator begins. . . .
Comparative law and legal history no longer can be, indeed
no longer are, content to confine themselves to doctrinal
analysis of positive law. But the social theory of law cannot be
a mere adjunct to doctrinal analysis, a series of qualifications
tacked on to an enterprise that otherwise remains unchanged.
Furthermore, social theory, if taken seriously, forces us to
confront the political content that is inextricably involved in
any account of law and, a fortiori, in any prescription for
reform.113
Alan would have largely agreed with Abel’s final sentence: “Studies using
historical and comparative materials to construct a social theory of when and
why legal rules are preserved under changed social conditions, and assessing
that persistence in terms of explicitly stated values, would be a major
contribution.”114 But he would have thought that this is what he had indeed
achieved in these books and a number of related articles.
By placing Abel’s critique of Alan’s work in the context of the Critical
Legal Studies movement, I should not be taken as thereby trying to devalue
the critique; rather, I suspect it explains why the review appeared so long
after the book had appeared. In a period when attitudes in the strongly
politicized U.S. Law Schools—with stiff competition for jobs in elite
institutions—were very polarized, Alan’s work presented a target, and the
review offered Abel a way of making some points about the aims of Critical
Legal Studies, while also criticizing a scholar who was not “one of us.”115
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Several years before Abel’s review, Alan had already developed his ideas
further in two important articles. The first was devoted to improving lawmaking.116 It was an example of what might nowadays be called “blue skies”
thinking. He set out a basic agenda:
The extent to which a source of law is “satisfactory” should be
judged . . . by three tests. First, how responsive is the law to
the serious needs and desires of the community? The more
easily a source of law allows law to change when society
undergoes change, the better the source of law. Secondly, how
comprehensible is the law to the persons affected by it? The
more comprehensible the law, the more satisfactory the source
of law. Thirdly, how comprehensive is the law? The more
certainly the existing law can provide an answer to the legal
problems that arise the more satisfactory is the source of law.
Typically a tension exists between the ease of comprehension
of law and its comprehensiveness.117
He argued that the way to secure this was to have “tiered law.” The first
rank law would be in the form of a code; the second rank would be both law
and commentary. The front rank law, according to which legal decisions had
to be made, had to be comprehensible, like the French Code civil, so that
ordinary citizens could understand it. The second rank law provided the
interpretation and detail, and had to be comprehensive, like commentaries on
the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.118 Problems would be referred to an
interpretative committee.119 If a problem were novel, as Alan pointed out,
precedents or analogies could be found in the civil law systems and the
Corpus iuris civilis itself.120 He applied the idea to an independent Scotland,
no doubt because the article originated in an address to the Andrew Fletcher
Society in Edinburgh.121
The second article, dedicated to Otto Kahn-Freund, was more obviously
on point, and was very clearly a development and clarification of the themes
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found in Legal Transplants.122 Starting with an explicit rejection of
Friedman’s position, Alan asserted:
Societies vary greatly, and so do legal rules. A perennial
question is “Do legal rules reflect a society’s desires, needs and
aspirations?” The answer which is normally given or is just
assumed is positive though minor qualifications are usually
urged. And yet, the two most startling, and at the same time
most obvious, characteristics of legal rules are the apparent
ease with which they can be transplanted from one system to
another, and their capacity for long life. With transmission or
the passing of time modifications may well occur, but
frequently the alterations in the rules have only limited
significance.123
He gave the reception and spread of the Roman and English laws as obvious
examples. They were applied to populations at different times and in
different places without any real problems. The longevity of rules was
“equally striking.”124 He argued that these two characteristics—transplants
and longevity—could also be identified in the structure of legal systems.125
He argued that comparative law should be the study of the relationship
between systems created by borrowing. He compared it in this respect to the
study of comparative linguistics, claiming it should lead to a theory about
law, through study of transplants. He went on to isolate and identify the
factors that he considered influenced borrowing. One of the most significant
was that of the role of lawyers in shaping the law.126
Alan concluded this article by arguing that:
To isolate the general factors at work in legal change it might,
in fact, be appropriate to seize a decisive moment, such as
codification and explain why it occurred at all, why in that
territory it occurred at the time it did and not before, why the
code was either a new creation for that territory or was
borrowed in large measure or virtually entire from elsewhere;
and of the latter, why the particular model was selected.
122
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Likewise it could be important to explain the absence of
codification in other systems.127
Here he pointed to the potential significance of study of codification in
Louisiana, also adding that study of codifying in Quebec would also be
fruitful.128 In Quebec, as in Louisiana, the code basically followed the
structure of that of France, but the law to be codified was that of Lower
Canada, that is to say law based on the Coutume de Paris. Alan raised a
variety of questions, such as: Why were the codes of Louisiana and Quebec
relatively independent in substance from the French code, while later
European and Latin-American codes sometimes followed it “slavishly?”
Why was the law not codified in systems such as South Africa, Texas, or
Scotland?129 Alan had already argued in Legal Transplants that study of the
early legal history of Louisiana was potentially of great interest to a
comparativist, because of the obviously massive borrowing found in the
Louisiana Civil Code.130
IV. REACTIONS IN THE LITERATURE, 1974–1985
It is here necessary that I should interject a personal note. In October
1973 I matriculated as a law student in the University of Edinburgh. One of
my first-year subjects was Civil Law—Civil law, of course, in the sense of
the ius civile, the law of Rome. Alan then held the chair that I now have the
honor to occupy, that of Civil Law. Alan, who has always relished teaching,
taught much of the course, lecturing in the spell-binding and charismatic way
his pupils recall. After an account of the law of Rome structured according
to Justinian’s Institutes, the year-long course finished, as indeed it still does,
with an introduction to the Reception of Roman law, with a particular focus
on Scotland. In the year of my attendance, the lectures on the Reception—
though I did not then realize it—were drawn from the discussion in Legal
Transplants. As a third-year student, in 1975–1976, I took the honors course
in Comparative Law. The theoretical part of the course was taught by Alan,
debating the views on comparative law found in Legal Transplants. I, for
one, was convinced, and indeed wrote an essay on the transplanting of
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Roman water law to such different places as the Netherlands and then South
Africa.131 In my final undergraduate year, 1976–1977, I enrolled in the
honors course in Civil Law, most of which was taught by Alan, with a
section on the Reception taught by Sandy McCall Smith (who had also
taught part of Comparative Law). A large part of the course was devoted to
a detailed consideration of D. 9.2 (ad legem Aquiliam); there was also a
section on the Twelve Tables. Alan had just published Rome of the Twelve
Tables, and he had a definite liking for teaching what he was researching.132
I wrote an essay tracing the development of clause pénale in the French
Code civil out of the Roman stipulatio poenae, perhaps indicating I was
developing more as a general legal historian than as a specialist scholar of
Roman law.
I then decided that I wished to study for the degree of Ph.D. with Alan,
examining the idea of legal transplants. Initially, I had thought of working
on law in South Africa; but this was at a time when visiting there could be
problematic. Alan instead suggested that I look at codification in Louisiana
and Quebec, following up the observation he had made in Legal Transplants,
and indeed reflecting what he was to say in his article on transplants in 1978.
I enrolled in 1977, writing a thesis with the descriptive—if cumbersome—
title of “The 1808 Digest of Orleans and 1866 Civil Code of Lower Canada:
An Historical Study of Legal Change.” I made a detailed study of the
composition of parts of the two codes, focusing on the activities and choices
of the codifiers, drawing conclusions on what this told us about law. The
dissertation was submitted in December 1980, and I graduated in 1981.133 I
did not then pursue this specific line of research further, though much of my
subsequent work has clearly developed out of various themes in my doctoral
dissertation, and I have published subsequently on the history of law in
Louisiana.134 I did not publish my dissertation, other than developing part as
an article on employment in the Civil Code of Lower Canada in a special
issue of the McGill Law Journal devoted to the history of the law in
Quebec.135 The publication of René David’s Tagore Law Lectures in 1980,
131
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however, did lead me to venture into the theoretical field of comparative law
and legal transplants.136 I wrote an essay disagreeing with David’s argument
for a new ius commune to be created at a doctrinal level by scholars of
comparative law working together.137 In many ways, although he was not
talking specifically of what later become known as the European Union, his
argument foreshadowed some current concerns in Europe. I was skeptical
for a variety of reasons, arguing that study of legal transplants suggested that
a variety of cultural factors might prevent this. I drew on my research in
Louisiana and Quebec, as well as discussing two authors in whom I was to
become very interested, Lord Kames and Sir William Blackstone.
As Alan’s pupil, I might well be expected to take his ideas and insights
seriously; but there are indications that Alan’s ideas of legal transplants had
some wider impact from the beginning. His perception may now be that
Legal Transplants was either ignored or excoriated in the period immediately
following its publication: hence his comment on its falling “stillborn from
the press.” This, of course, is an allusion to David Hume’s famous comment
that his Treatise “fell dead-born from the press.”138 Hume had added,
however, that his work did not reach “such distinction, as even to excite a
murmur among the zealots.”139 I think, however, that Alan would agree,
judging by the reviews already discussed, that his work did excite murmurs
among those whom he would class as zealots, and its successor, Society and
Legal Change, perhaps even more so. But, if not completely ignored, Legal
Transplants probably did not generate as much discussion as Alan had
initially hoped in the first decade or so after publication; but it certainly
generated some. Without claiming to make a comprehensive survey of
discussion in this period, and without revisiting the highly critical and
dismissive reviews already discussed, some trends may be identified. While
there may have been doubters, much of what Alan said can be seen as having
been accepted—increasingly so as the years went by—until it became simply
received knowledge and “legal transplant” a normal term. This seems to
have happened by the middle years of the 1980s.
Stein’s distinction of Alan’s and Kahn-Freund’s approaches to legal
transplants, as being between those of a “Legal Historian” and a “LawyerSociologist,” evidently resonated. And many subsequent scholars “read”
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their differences in a similar fashion.140 We have noted the attitudes
expressed in reviews of Society and Legal Change by Adams, Friedman, and
Diamond, who could be classified as “Lawyer-Sociologists.” Thus, in 1982,
Christopher Whelan explored the introduction of the emergency procedures
under the Industrial Relations Act 1971 in an article on labor law very
strongly influenced by the thinking of Kahn-Freund, who had recently died,
and whom he acknowledged at the end.141 As a case-study of transplants,
Whelan argued that these provisions had been drawn from U.S. law, arguing
that the differences between the two systems of labor law meant that the
American provisions could not be transferred successfully. He pointed out
that Alan’s views on legal transplants differed from those of Kahn-Freund,
and that Alan had argued “that the domestic law reformer need only look for
an idea which could be transformed into domestic law, for which a
systematic knowledge of the law or political structure of the donor system
was not necessary (though law reform might be more efficient if such
knowledge was obtained).”142 Whelan did not comment on whether he
considered that Alan had been refuted; but his subtle and sophisticated study
could lead to an argument either way. In 1984, Michael Bridge cited KahnFreund, but not Alan, on transplants, to the effect that it was “dangerous and
disruptive to believe that the comparative legal method can be used to justify
highly selective legal transplants without regard to the whole of a country’s
legal tradition.”143 This was more in the way of a passing remark than
anything else, but it is evidently contrary to Alan’s view.
In contrast, legal historians seem often to have been more broadly
sympathetic to Alan’s arguments or at least to have recognized the potential
they held and to have demonstrated a willingness to engage with them. In
1975, Hans Baade suggested that “a study of the history of the form of
marriage in Spanish North America [was] likely to afford new insights into
the question of the comparative viability of ‘legal transplants.’ ”144 In
discussing the Roman law of guardianship in England in 1978, R.H.
Helmholz asked whether it was possible to talk of a “legal transplant.”145 In
1979, citing both Legal Transplants and Society and Legal Change, Charles
140
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Donahue simply accepted that “[l]egal ideas can be transplanted from
societies with one set of legal institutions and social structures to societies
with quite different institutions and structures.”146
In this period, one of the most important discussions of transplants, which
foreshadowed much more recent debate, was by John Henry Merryman, the
distinguished comparative lawyer and expert on cultural property. In May,
1977, in a colloquium devoted to the possibility of a “Common Law of
Europe,” at the newly established European University Institute at Badia
Fiesolana just outside Florence, Merryman presented a paper entitled “On the
Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law.”147
In this he turned to the debate involving Kahn-Freund and Alan (Merryman
also was aware of Beckstrom’s piece), devoting a subsection to legal
transplants in his section on “Strategies of Convergence.”148 Citing Legal
Transplants in general fashion, Merryman commented that “[l]egal
transplantation has a long history.”149 He cited a series of examples of
transplantation, including from Beckstrom’s work, before commenting that
“[l]egal transplants across the Civil law-Common law boundary obviously
lead in the direction of convergence of the two systems.”150 He concluded
his discussion of transplants by commenting that “[m]ost fundamental is the
completely unresolved question whether ‘successful’ transplants are
beneficial or detrimental in their impact.”151 He noted that:
The entire topic has recently been revived by Professors
Beckstrom and Watson and by the colloquy between Professor
Watson and Professor Kahn-Freund. One important, and
fundamental, aspect of that debate involves a differing
assessment of history. Enthusiasts for transplantation point to
the reception of West European codes in China, Japan, Turkey
and Ethiopia. Skeptics argue that these “receptions” were only
partially successful at best, took an enormous effort and
investment of resources, and may have been both less effective
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Charles Donahue, What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in England
and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REV. 59, 60 (1979).
147
John H. Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil and the Common
Law, in NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE 195 (Mauro Cappelletti ed.,
1978).
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Id. at 207–10.
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Id. at 207.
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Id. at 209.
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and more costly than alternative strategies of law reform.
There is no obvious way to resolve this issue.152
His point is in many ways intellectually akin to that made by Eric Stein about
whether one is a “Legal Historian” or a “Lawyer-Sociologist.”153 Different
disciplines were predisposing scholars to different answers.
A number of writers were obviously familiar with the debate between
Alan and Kahn-Freund, but did not follow Stein’s and Merryman’s attempts
to engage with it. Thus, in 1981, Pnina Lahav, raised as a question: “What
are the effects of transplantation on the development of indigenous
constitutional law?” A footnote commented: “The debate about the
feasibility of organic as compared with mechanic transplantation had begun
with Montesquieu and continues to this day,” citing Kahn-Freund’s article of
1974, and Alan’s of 1976.154 While not substantially relying on KahnFreund or Alan’s works, Lahav’s article fruitfully used the concept of a legal
transplant throughout to make a powerful analysis of the transplantation and
rejection of American law in Israel. The author concluded that:
Transplantation of American law, however, has been less than
successful. The transplantor’s solid knowledge of the donor
system, sensitivity to the need of organic integration of foreign
law into the recipient system and mastery of judicial
decisionmaking [sic] techniques, may help in building
resistance to rejection, but they are not enough. It is one thing
to compress the jurisprudence of the First Amendment into one
Israeli decision and weave it into the local system so that it
gains a potential to become an organic part of it. It is another
thing to persuade other judges or to follow the same route.
Judicial philosophies — legal formalism or sociological
jurisprudence — are decisive determinants. Political visions,
as molded by the particular history of the recipient, inevitably
affect the choice of the transplantor.155

152

Id. at 209–10.
Stein, supra note 63, at 199–203. It is worth noting that Merryman, though he does not
cite Stein’s article, which would not have appeared at the time he penned this, nonetheless
expressed his gratitude to Stein for reading a draft and making helpful suggestions for
improvement. Merryman, supra note 147, at 195 n.*.
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Pnina Lahav, American Influence on Israel’s Jurisprudence of Free Speech, 9 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 21, 27 n.19 (1981).
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But Lahav did not reflect on the debate between Kahn-Freund and Alan, nor
did she draw general conclusions about transplants and transplanting as a
phenomenon.
Other scholars simply accepted the lessons of Legal Transplants
apparently without examination. For example, in 1979, Basil Edwards, after
making glancing references to transplants in the footnotes to an article on
choice of law in delict, finally relied on Alan’s arguments on transplants to
support the view that it should be possible in integrate law of an origin other
than Roman-Dutch into the law of South Africa.156 Another South African
scholar, Ben Beinart, referred to Legal Transplants in a posthumously
published, unfinished paper (of 1979) printed in 1982.157 As Alan had
recognized, southern Africa provided fertile ground for the study of
transplants, and in 1982 an article on divorce reform in Botswana made that
point clearly.158 But study of Federal rules of procedure could also be
influenced by the ideas in Legal Transplants. This, in 1982, Stephen
Burbank, in a lengthy historical and contemporary analysis of the (Federal)
Rules Enabling Act of 1933, published in May 1982, noted that a model had
been used with a tradition quite different from that of the Federal system.159
Quoting Legal Transplants, he commented:
[T]he lessons of comparative law should make us wary of a
hasty conclusion that the supporters’ choice of a model doomed
their effort to confusion. For “usually legal rules are not
peculiarly devised for the particular society in which they now
operate and . . . this is not a matter of great concern.”160
Burbank acknowledged Alan’s assistance in reading a draft of this article.161
In another article on procedure published in December of that year, Burbank
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A.B. Edwards, Choice of Law in Delict: Rules or Approach, 96 S. AFR. L.J. 43, 71 n.239,
73 nn.253, 255, 80 n.277 (1979). For a contrasting view, arguing against transplantability, see
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Ben Beinart, The English Legal Contribution to South Africa: The Interaction of Civil
and Common Law, ACTA JURIDICA 7, 14, 54 (1981).
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A.J.G.M. Sanders, Ten Years of the Botswana Matrimonial Causes Act—Further
Proposals for Divorce Reform, 26 J. AFR. L. 163, 164–66 (1982).
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Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
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Id. at 1186 (citing LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra note 1, at 74). Burbank also
noted that “there is evidence in the 1926 Senate Report that the New York model was altered
to suit the perceived needs of the federal system.” Id. at 1186 n.735.
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Id. at 1015 n.†.
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again drew on insights from Legal Transplants, noting that “borrowing
impeded procedural innovation.”162
Of course, some authors simply cited Legal Transplants for a point it
contained on comparative law or legal history, rather than for any general or
theoretical claims it may have contained. In this way, Gregory Alexander
cited it in 1976 for the observation that language difficulties can cause
problems for the unwary in comparison.163 Likewise Legal Transplants
could be cited for the observation that the interpretation of rules can vary
over time.164 An author could rely on it for Alan’s comments on codification
and despotism.165 David Carey Miller cited Alan’s discussion of the
interrelationship of the laws of New Zealand and England in 1980.166
Sometimes Legal Transplants could be referred to for its perceptive
historical observations.167 It provided one author with part of a footnote on
the laws of colonial Massachusetts.168 R.J. Schoeck could enjoy Alan’s pithy
reformulation of a famous apothegm of Holmes.169 In a debate on the future
of public international law, both Kahn-Freund and Alan could be cited on
transplants for a debate on the evolutionary development of law.170 While
not involving an engagement with the theoretical issues raised by Legal
Transplants, these uses show the growing level of currency in the literature
that the book was achieving, a currency underlined by its choice as a book,
“selected at random” in 1978, as an exemplar of books that are “valuable
sources of inspiration and authority for the creative lawyer and jurist.”171
One notable effect was the slow but sure spread of the terminology of
“legal transplant,” sometimes without a mention of the work of either Alan
162
Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 313 (1982).
163
Gregory Alexander, The Application and Avoidance of Foreign Law in the Law of
Conflicts, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 602, 629 n.121 (1976).
164
Id. at 633 n.139.
165
David Friedman, On the Interpretation of Modern Israeli Legislation, 5 TEL AVIV U. L.
REV. 463, 479 n.80 (1977) (in Hebrew).
166
David Carey Miller, Rights of the Surviving Spouse: A Distinct System in Scotland and
Developments in England, ACTA JURIDICA 49, 56 (1980).
167
Alejandro M. Garro, Recording of Real Estate Transactions in Latin America: A
Comparison with the Recording System in the United States, 1984 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
90, 97; John W. Cairns, Blackstone, An English Institutist: Legal Literature and the Rise of the
Nation State, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 318, 320 (1984).
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George A. Zaphiriou, Use of Comparative Law by the Legislator, 30 AM. J. COMP. L.
SUPP. 71, 72 n.8 (1982).
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R.J. Schoeck, The Aesthetics of the Law, 28 AM. J. JURIS. 46, 56 n.30 (1983).
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Sanford R. Silverburg, Pale and Wan, Comatose Maybe, But Not Dead: A Response to
Bleimaier, 25 CATH. LAW. 237, 238 n.8 (1980).
171
Jack A. Hiller, The Law-Creative Role of Appellate Courts in the Commonwealth, 27
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 85, 120 (1978).
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or Kahn-Freund (or indeed Beckstrom). The term was used by Torres in
1976, in a study of the Puerto Rican penal code: neither author was
mentioned, and there were no citations of their works.172 In 1981, Daniel
Coquillette, in an article on the English Civilians, described them as
believing that “ideas about law were eminently suitable for transplanting.”173
In the same year, Julio Menezes, in an article on the support of legal
institutions in an impoverished society, talked of “ill-fated and pernicious
legal transplants” also without any reference.174 Three years later, Douglas
Hay, discussing the history and historiography of criminal prosecution in
England, wrote that Canadian historians “are more apt to be aware of legal
transplants, imposition of law, recourse to martial law, and the slow and
contradictory way English law became part of our culture.”175 Another
author simply remarked that the term “legal transplants” was used “virtually
interchangeably” for “reception theory,” “borrowing,” and incorporation.176
The author shared Kahn-Freund’s view of the feasibility of transplants,
however, rather than Alan’s.177 There is no way of knowing whether or not
these authors were conscious or aware of the debate between Alan and KahnFreund—it is difficult to believe that at least some of them were not. Given
the topics of their respective articles, a discussion of the matter would have
been illuminating. But what these uses of the terminology demonstrate is its
increasing familiarity and the comfort of writers in its use, reflecting the way
discussions of legal transplants were starting to become routine in the later
1970s.
Alan himself had continued to contribute on the topic. In 1977, he
published The Nature of Law, a book in which he argued that what
distinguished law was the existence of processes to resolve disputes and
promote order that could be backed by force.178 In the work he devoted a
chapter to the importance of the legal profession in any understanding of law
and society. He there argued that law was often developed by borrowing,
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Eulalio A. Torres, The Puerto Rico Penal Code of 1902–1975: A Case Study of American
Legal Imperialism, 45 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 2, 42, 71 (1976).
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Douglas Hay, The Criminal Prosecution in England and Its Historians, 47 MOD. L. REV.
1, 24 (1984).
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Eugene Cerruti, The Demise of the Aguilar-Spinelli Rule: A Case of Faulty Reception, 61
DENV. L.J. 431, 457 (1984).
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Id. at 458 (citing GYULA EÖRSI, COMPARATIVE CIVIL (PRIVATE) LAW: LAW TYPES, LAW
GROUPS, THE ROADS OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 423 (1979)).
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and explained the factors that influenced this practice in specific cases.179
The book received some reviews, but otherwise did not generate much
discussion.180 Alan next published The Making of the Civil Law in 1981.181
In this he explored why the civil law countries differed from one another,
despite the common foundation of their legal systems in Roman law; but he
again saw the answer to this question as rooted in the activities of lawyers,
and the historical traditions of particular systems, rejecting what one might
call instrumental explanations of legal change. This book was much more
extensively reviewed, particularly in North America, perhaps reflecting its
publication by Harvard University Press and Alan’s move to the Law School
of the University of Pennsylvania. It is too crude to say that legal historians
liked it, while others did not; but reviews were certainly mixed.182 In the
same year, he summarized in a short article his main points about the “forces
that control legal change.”183 He concluded that “[w]hile the legal tradition
plays a fundamental role in legal change, legal rules, structures, and
institutions are often greatly out of step with western society,” and that this
had important implications in undertaking satisfactory law reform.184 A
much more developed argument was presented in 1983, in which he
synthesized his views, answered critics, and stressed the importance of the
specific culture of legal élites.185 All of these themes were developed in two
further books, Sources of Law, Legal Change and Ambiguity and The
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Id. at 99–113.
G.D. MacCormack, Book Review, 23 JURID. REV. (N.S.) 85 (1978) (reviewing THE
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Evolution of Law.186 These received fewer reviews; but again these were
mixed and varying.187
If these further developments of Alan’s ideas continued to receive often
skeptical reviews, by the date of the publication of these last-mentioned two
books, the idea and terminology of legal transplants had become standard. In
1978, the reviewer of The Impact of American Law on English and
Commonwealth Law (1978) wrote that “transplantation of law is a common
historical occurrence,” citing Alan, Kahn-Freund, and Stein.188 As the string
of citations for the propositions suggests, he did not feel the need to
investigate the issue further. In 1981, Merryman’s paper of 1977 that in part
discussed transplants was reprinted in an American law review.189 By 1982,
Edward Wise could open an article on comparative law with the Watsonian
comment: “Comparative law is concerned with relationships between legal
systems. It has been said: no relationship, no comparative law.”190 His
authority for this was Legal Transplants.191 In the same year, Paul Jackson
commented that “[t]he longevity and capacity of legal rules to take root in
alien soil have been made commonplace by Watson,” also citing Legal
Transplants.192 Again in 1982, Judith Wegner, seemingly unaware of others’
use of the term, in discussing Islamic jurists’ borrowing form Talmudic law,
asked whether this was “in a word, an instance of what Alan Watson has
felicitously called ‘legal transplants’?”193 When Maurice Tancelin used the
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term “legal transplant” in 1984, it required no citation or explanation.194 The
book itself was simply becoming regarded as a standard or classic work on
comparative law.
Assisting the spread of the influence of Alan’s thinking on transplants
was the fact that, almost contemporaneously, some continental European
scholars had started to develop a very similar approach. In 1972, Jean
Rivero had pointed out that a state, whether historic or modern, could create
its own administrative legal structures or could copy those of another state.
The latter was the most common practice, he stated.195 He debated how this
should be characterized, having already noted that, as a phenomenon it was
easier to describe than to give an adequate juridical name. He debated the
terms, “exchange,” “borrowing,” and “imitation,” or whether, as noted
above, one should borrow “the language of advanced surgery” and talk of
“transplantation of organs,” though the donor kept the organ and it was a
facsimile that was attempted to be integrated into a new milieu. But the
problem would be to know if the organ was accepted into the body or was
rejected. Rivero decided that the terminology was not important, but
description of the phenomenon was.196 But his flirting with the terminology
of legal transplant is significant in indicating the type of phenomenon of
which he was thinking, as he put it:
The entire history of constitutions, except for a few rare
original prototypes, was made up of imitations, adaptations and
rejections. The history of civil law itself offers classic
examples, whether it be Ataturk’s Turkey importing the Swiss
Civil Code, or the diffusion of the Code Napoléon.197
His whole paper is full of the language of borrowing (emprunte),
transplanting (greffe), and rejection. He mentioned the “fundamental
194
Maurice Tancelin, Comment on Michael Bridge’s Paper: Does Anglo-American Contract
Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?, 9 CAN. BUS. L.J. 430, 431 (1984).
195
Rivero, supra note 43, at 459.
196
Id. (“Si l’on pouvait emprunter le langage de la chirurgie avancée, c’est à la greffe
d’organes qu’on aurait recours, a cette nuance près — qui est d’importance! — que l’organe
administrative, institution ou règle, possède sur l’organe vivant l’enviable supériorité de
pouvoir être greffé sans dépossession du donneur: celui-ci grade l’original, et c’est un facsimile qui va tenter de s’intégrer dans son nouveau milieu. Mais dans les deux cas, le problem
est de savoir si la greffe prendra, si l’organe va s’incorporer dans le tissue qui l’a reçu, ou si,
au contraire, un phenomena de rejet se produira.”).
197
Id. at 459–60 (“[T]oute l’histoire des constitutions, à partir de quelques rare prototypes
originaux, est faite d’imitations, d’adaptations et de rejets. Les droits civils, eux aussi, offrent
des exemples classiques, qi’il s’agisse de la Turquie d’Ataturk important le Code civil Suisse,
ou du rayonnement de Code Napoléon.”).
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problem posed by all transplants: the success or failure of the operation.”198
He explored the contexts of transplants that were successful and those that
were rejected. Seemingly unaware of Rivero’s paper, in 1976, Jean
Gaudemet, a noted French historian of medieval civil and canon law,
published an article entitled “Les transferts de droit.”199 In it he pointed out
that lawyers, sociologists and historians all viewed law differently. He
thought it possible nonetheless to draw on these different approaches to
explain the juridical experience of which history furnished many examples
that had very varied origins and causes, namely: “the introduction into a
society of law or specific legal rules that had been developed in a different
social situation and sometimes in an already distant era.”200 Gaudemet noted
that one could discuss the effects of European colonization and influence in
the Americas, Africa and Asia; but he limited his discussion to ancient
Rome, medieval and modern Europe, and the spread of the Code Napoléon
in the nineteenth century.201 He explained successful “receptions” as due to
the technical qualities of the borrowed law, especially if local customs were
undeveloped, particularly in face of a transforming society. He also noted
the significance of the prestige of a culture, the technical qualities of a code,
and its style as factors. He also isolated problems in reception. But he
focused on the significance of practitioners and legislators in a successful
reception. His factors and mechanisms were in many ways comparable with
those isolated by Alan.202 Other French scholars, drawing on similar ideas,
developed the concept of “migration of legal systems.”203 Thus, in French,
the terminology of “transfert,” “migration,” “greffe,” “imitation,”
“importation,” and “circulation” became used to deal with the type of
phenomena already discussed by Alan.204
In 1974, Rodolfo Sacco, an Italian comparativist, had linked the type of
phenomena Alan labelled transplants with methodological issues of
comparative law.205 Sacco continued to develop these ideas through the
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1970s. In 1977, he contributed to the colloquium at Badia Fiesolana on a
“Common Law of Europe.” His title was “Droit commun de l’Europe, et
composantes du droit.”206 In it he discussed the “circulation des modèles
jurisprudentiels” as a factor in unifying law.207 “Composantes du droit”
seems to be a French rendering of his now well-known idea of “formanti” or
“legal formants.”208 The theory of “legal formants” is that the “legal
landscape consists of components not necessarily coherent with each other,”
rather than of a hierarchical set of norms, in style a pyramid, deriving from a
“sovereign at the top directed to the subject at the bottom.” It has recently
been described as “probably the most important and lasting contribution of
Italian scholarship to the discipline of comparative law.”209 Sacco accepted
the idea of transplants or (in French) “circulation.”210 In 1980, he published
a very influential textbook on comparative law,211 in which, by the fifth
edition, he had an extensive discussion of Alan’s work in his development of
his ideas of transplants in line with his theory of legal formants.212 The
influence of Sacco in Italy and France helped further popularize Alan’s work
on transplants in these two countries and make it familiar to continental
Europeans. As a result, in 1984, Legal Transplants was published in an
Italian edition.213
By 1985 Legal Transplants was becoming routinely cited on topics such
the borrowing of an exclusionary rule in criminal evidence, or legal thought
in Upper Canada.214 It may be pointed out that Whelan, who in 1982 had
been strongly influenced by Kahn-Freund, now cited Legal Transplants in
1985 in a string of citations to support the proposition that there “has been
for some time a substantial but largely theoretical body of literature
(found cited in Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 41, at 441, 442).
206
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proposing ground rules for proper application of the comparative method.”215
In the same year, in a bibliographical survey of comparative law, Kurt
Schwerin could write:
Much of Watson’s thesis as to the impact of Roman Law on the
civil law systems and its transplantability is well-known and
undisputed by every comparatist. What is disputable is the
emphasis on pure legal history as against social, economic,
philosophical, and political influences. Watson’s approach is
noteworthy.216
He was commenting on Alan’s later book, The Making of the Civil Law,
which explains the focus of the quotation, though he did acknowledge the
relationship to Legal Transplants.217 But it should be noted, this was no
longer a blunt rejection of Alan’s views; but rather it was a claim that Alan’s
emphasis on the forces behind legal change is wrong—the basic thesis of
Legal Transplants was now claimed as accepted by all comparative lawyers.
As a scholar working on public law contemporaneously put it: “There is now
a substantial literature concerned with the problems of seeking to transfer or
‘transplant’ a rule or technique developed in one culture to another.”218
V. THE TRIUMPH OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, 1986–2013
It is not possible to treat this period with the same level of detail. This is
because use of the term “legal transplant” has become so universal in the last
quarter-century that it is simply not feasible to discuss the literature other
than in a highly selective fashion. And the volume of discussion generated
has indeed been enormous, as a general acceptance of Alan’s approach, at
least in part, as having value and utility has developed (although some
scholars have remained hostile). As a quick demonstration, one can point to
the recent Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law as having devoted a
chapter to transplants in considering, “Approaches to Comparative Law.”219
The extent to which Alan’s arguments have provided a standard means of
analysis in comparative law is underscored by the remark on the opening
215
Christopher J. Whelan, Labor Law and Comparative Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1425, 1426
(1985).
216
Kurt Schwerin, Comparative Law Reflections: A Bibliographical Survey, 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 1315, 1329 (1985).
217
Id. at 1328.
218
John Goldring, Public Law and Accountability of Government, 15 FED. L. REV. 1, 16
(1985).
219
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page of the even more recent Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law
that one way of understanding comparative law is “as the study of legal
transplants — that is, of the borrowing of ideas between legal cultures and/or
systems. . . .”220 To demonstrate the triumph of legal transplants, we may
first consider some very recent articles, from differing areas of the law,
which draw in some way on Alan’s theories, and show how varied the use of
Alan’s theorizing has become, before considering the developments in this
period.
The distinguished company lawyer John H. Farrar published an article in
2011 on the liability of company directors, arguing that a transplant within
the Anglo-American company law world had caused problems. He
suggested that had more attention been paid to the operation of a rule in the
United States, it might not have been transplanted to Malaysia and Australia.
It did not fit well with Australian practice.221 Even though his point might
arguably be seen as supporting Kahn-Freund’s approach, it was Alan’s work
that was cited.222 In the same year Meryll Dean argued that her study of jury
trial in Japan showed the basic accuracy of Alan’s theory of transplants.223
In 2010, the distinguished French legal historian, Jean-Louis Halpérin,
applied the ideas of transplants to colonial India.224 The year before, Eric
Gillman had published a paper on the transplanting of trade and investment
law from the United States to Latin America.225 Legal Transplants has also
been seen as providing a means to analyze U.S. trust law in China.226
Scholars have also looked at transplantation of legal ideas through private
contracting, as distinct from through the activities of the state.227 These
topics are far from Alan’s own particular interests, again demonstrating the
success of Legal Transplants.
By 1985 the tide had very definitely started to turn in favor of Legal
Transplants; to trace its subsequent rise to being a dominant idea in
comparative law, it is worth starting with a review in 1987 of The Evolution
220
Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, Diapositives versus Movies — The Inner Dynamics of the
Law and its Comparative Account, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 3,
3 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012).
221
John H. Farrar, Directors’ Duties of Care: Issues of Classification, Solvency, and
Business Judgment and the Dangers of Transplants, 23 SING. ACAD. L.J. 745, 761 (2011).
222
Id. at 761 n.52.
223
Dean, supra note 13.
224
Jean-Louis Halpérin, Western Legal Transplants and India, 2 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 12
(2010). I am grateful to Professor Halpérin for supplying me with a copy of his article.
225
Eric Gillman, Legal Transplants in Trade and Investment Agreements: Understanding
the Exportation of U.S. Law to Latin America, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 263, 282–300 (2009).
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Foster, supra note 10, at 621–37.
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Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct
in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (2009).
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of Law (1985) found in the influential “Survey of Books Relating to the
Law” that the Michigan Law Review publishes each year—the same annual
survey in which Abel’s “trashing” review of Society and Legal Change had
appeared a few years earlier. The reviewer was Michael Hoeflich, a leading
U.S. legal historian, then of the University of Illinois College of Law.228
Hoeflich’s careful and scholarly review is important as perhaps the best in
explaining Alan’s thinking. Hoeflich described the book thus:
It is a brief but brilliant exposition of two basic questions.
First, to what extent is the development of law autonomous and
independent of societal needs and demands? Second, how can
one explain, within the context of this relationship between law
and society, why so many legal systems borrow extensively, in
the matter of specific substantive rules as well as broad
jurisprudential categories, from other alien legal systems?
It is clear that Professor Watson’s concerns stem, to a large
extent from a question that has troubled legal historians and
legal philosophers for centuries. That is: how does one explain
the puzzling phenomenon of legal reception?229
Hoeflich’s perceptive analysis went to the core of Alan’s thinking:
Central to Professor Watson’s theory is the notion that where a
professional class develops (and he — like I — would argue
that such a class develops early in Western Europe) it is this
group’s professional traditions and professional concerns
which shape the law — especially private law — far more than
any social input.230
Hoeflich analyzed Alan’s account of the reception of Roman law in western
Europe in the early middle ages. He pointed out that, to a point, most
scholars would have agreed with much of Alan’s analysis.231 He added,
however, that:

228
Michael H. Hoeflich, Law, Society and Reception: The Vision of Alan Watson, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1083 (1987) (reviewing THE EVOLUTION OF LAW, supra note 186). As noted above,
the book developed Alan’s earlier arguments.
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230
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What is crucial to Professor Watson’s view of law . . . comes
after this initial reception. These Roman rules, once adopted,
continued to be included in Germanic legal compilations, and
these compilations themselves tended to be adopted and
adapted cross-nationally for centuries throughout Western
Europe. Were they at all times fulfilling a perceived and
current societal need? Professor Watson would argue that they
were not. Rather, by virtue of having become established legal
rules, they became the property of legists and as such came to
have a life independent of immediate social demands. Indeed,
this would seem to have been the case. They continued to be
compiled and adopted because they had become part of a legal
canon accepted by legal professionals. The legal history of
early medieval Europe in this regard tends to bear out Professor
Watson’s theories.232
He explained that what this means is that “the interconnection between law
and society is not so close as to preclude borrowing from alien systems.
Reception is both possible and explicable so long as one recognizes that the
most important group for reception of legal rules is the legal elite.”233 In
sum, what matters most is the attitude of the lawyers and the law-making
elite, who may “act as a filter of social demands;” indeed they may, for
reasons of their own deliberately ignore them.234
Other than one or two of the reviews of The Making of the Civil Law, this
was the first really sympathetic and sensitive review of Alan’s work on
comparative law to appear in the United States since Maechling’s original
assessment of Legal Transplants twelve years earlier.235 But there are many
other indicators of a general change of attitude Alan’s work on transplants.
Thus, he was now cited approvingly even in Kahn-Freund’s field of labor
law. In the introduction to The Making of Labour Law in Europe: A
Comparative Study of Nine Countries up to 1945, Bob (now Sir Bob)
Hepple, one of Britain’s most distinguished labor lawyers, wrote in 1986:
“The generalization that ‘borrowing (with adaptation) has been the usual way
of legal development’ is at least as true for labour law as it is for other
branches of law.”236 The quotation was from Legal Transplants, which he
232
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cited.237 Indeed, authors developed hypotheses from Legal Transplants and
drew on its thinking in fields as diverse as feminism and pornography238 and
the possibility of reforming American criminal justice with selective
borrowing from French law.239 Curiously enough, it could still sometimes be
cited simply for some information it contained, such as the development of
the law on legitimation by subsequent marriage in New Zealand and
England.240 Given how many other sources there must have been for this
information, the citation is testimony to the success of the book as a standard
work, being treated now almost as one of reference rather than of opinion.
Of course, detractors remained;241 but they were fewer.
If by the later 1980s Alan’s idea of legal transplants was becoming very
well-known, two events made his work resonate even more for
contemporaries through the 1990s. The first was the destruction of the
Berlin wall and the consequent astonishingly rapid collapse of the Soviet
Empire. A whole series of new states emerged or old states re-emerged in
central and Eastern Europe, seeking modern legal systems and laws.242 The
second was the intensification of the debate over harmonization or
unification of private law in Europe, a debate made more urgent by the
European Parliament’s quite extraordinary issue of resolutions calling for a
code of European Law.243
In 1990, given how current the issue was becoming, it is no surprise that
the XIIIth Congress of Comparative Law, held in Montreal in 1990, devoted

McDonough, Transferability of Labor Law: Can an American Transplant Take Root in British
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a section to “Circulation des modèles juridiques,” in other words, to legal
transplants. The American scholar Edward Wise provided an important
discussion, published in the supplement to the American Journal of
Comparative Law, that started with a full and very detailed analysis of
Alan’s work on transplants. Drawing a contrast with Montesquieu and
Friedman, Wise stressed Alan’s arguments in favor of the relative autonomy
of law, largely due to the significance of the legal profession in developing
the law, and the importance of borrowing in this development.244 A
discussion of the historiography of U.S. legal history followed.245 Wise then
noted that borrowing was a common cultural experience: it was not restricted
to law, developing a critique of Alan’s views that accepted much of what he
said, but arguing that influences on borrowing were wider than Alan
suggested.246
The next year, Sacco’s Italian textbook was published in French.247
Though never published in an English translation as a book, much of its
substance appeared in the same year in two lengthy articles translated from
the Italian. These were edited by the legal historian and comparative lawyer
Jim Gordley and printed in the American Journal of Comparative Law.248
This version rather underplays the very extensive attention given to Alan’s
work on transplants found in the fourth edition of Sacco’s textbook;
nonetheless this prominent and much cited publication inevitably engendered
further consideration of Alan’s work, both in Europe and North America.
An overt consideration of the correspondence between their ideas appeared a
couple of years later.249 In 1994, Alan participated in the ceremony in the
University of Turin when Sacco was presented with his Festschrift,
delivering a paper entitled “From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants.”250
The popularity of Sacco’s work both at home and elsewhere, combined with
his and his pupils’ dominant position in comparative law in Italy, inevitably
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promoted further reflection on Alan’s scholarship on Legal Transplants.251
The work of Michele Graziadei has proved particularly insightful and
important in developing our understanding of legal transplants.252
Interest in Alan’s work was now such that a second edition of Legal
Transplants was published by the University of Georgia Press in 1993. It
consisted of a reproduction of the first edition with an “Afterword.”253
Perhaps it was this publication with the continuing debate that stimulated
William Ewald in 1995 to publish a fundamentally sympathetic evaluation
and interpretation of Alan’s work (which does not mean Alan should be
taken as accepting all of Ewald’s analysis).254 This was part of Ewald’s
general project on comparative law.255 Ewald did not reflect, for example, on
the relationship between the theorizing of Alan and Sacco, but instead
investigated Alan’s corpus of writings. His aim was to synthesize Alan’s
views on comparative law and set them out in a logical and much more
abstract form, divorced from the detailed historical discussions in which
Alan had developed them.256 Ewald argued that there was “Weak Watson”
and “Strong Watson.”257 Alan would dispute this.258 But Ewald’s analysis
has exerted considerable influence on further discussion of the possibilities
of transplants.259 In particular his description of approaches such as that of
Friedman as “mirror theories” has resonated.260 He also convincingly
251
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demonstrated the mistaken nature and weakness of aspects of Abel’s
critique.261 Some scholars, however, have rejected Ewald’s privileging of an
essentially philosophical approach to comparative law, and have found more
merit in Alan’s arguments themselves.262 Indeed others have attempted to
develop the idea in quite different and also interesting ways.263
But a renewed line of debate over Alan’s theory of legal transplants has
developed, linked to some extent to Ewald’s discussion. Partly similar to the
views early expressed by Kahn-Freund, this might loosely be described as
focused on the concept of “legal culture,” and it has become a fairly
dominant mode of criticism. The fundamental idea is the obvious one that
focusing on the rules of positive law misses much that is important about any
legal system. The deployment of legal culture as an analytical category in
sociological approaches to law has been strongly associated since 1969 with
the work of Lawrence Friedman.264 In that year he commented: “Much of
the working law of a mature, industrial society is comparatively specific to
its country.”265 He also commented that “only recently have societies
borrowed codes, legal systems, and whole bodies of law.”266 In a paper from
1985, but published in English in 1990, the German legal historian, Franz
Wieacker, drawing on historical evidence, argued that there was a European
legal culture, and attempted to identify its features.267 Some have found
Friedman’s concept of legal culture fragmented and vague;268 Wieacker’s
account was so abstract that it is difficult to assess the significance of his
claims. Despite this, however, a relatively early deployment of this approach
in comparative law is found in Bernhard Grossfeld’s study, published in
English in 1990, where the author argued that legal systems were very
closely linked to culture generally, including religion, language, and
geography.269 Grossfeld accepted some of what Alan argued;270 but
261

Id. at 504–08.
ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY: LEGAL IDEAS IN THE MIRROR OF
SOCIAL THEORY 109–14 (2006).
263
Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History
and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (2003).
264
Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 29
(1969) [hereafter Friedman, Legal Culture]; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A
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disagreed with what he considered as Alan’s optimism “about the possibility
of transplanting legal institutions.”271 The nature of law as a cultural
phenomenon created such constraints and linked it so closely to the culture
within which it developed that transfer of laws from one culture to another
was unlikely and very difficult. This is not the place to rehearse a critique of
the details of Grossfeld’s argument;272 but others developed it to encompass
criticism of Ewald’s attempt to reformulate Alan’s views of transplants in a
more abstract fashion.273 It is important to point out, however, that Alan
himself draws on ideas of culture, but ones significantly less broad than those
of Grossfeld, instead concentrating on the significance of the legal culture of
the lawyers;274 but the early association of “legal culture” with the work of
Friedman, understanding the concept as being about a “totality” of culture,
has tended to lead more theoretically-focused scholars to embed in the
concept his assumptions about law and society, particularly given the
potential vagueness and flexibility of the idea.275
What Grossfeld argued has been developed in its extreme form by Pierre
Legrand in a number of papers from the mid-1990s onwards, the most
important of which claimed that legal transplants were impossible.276
Legrand’s argument was elaborated from what were essentially
epistemological premises and anthropological theory. He argued that law
simply could not be separated from its context. Indeed the law only existed
as interpreted and applied “within an interpretative community.”277 Law was
“a matter of myth and narrative,” which, if belonging to another culture, we
could only grasp “imperfectly through translation rather than expect to find a
method of reproducing its ‘effects.’ ”278 To put it crudely, in other words,
law only has a meaning in context; change the context and the law changes.
It is, of course, far from a foolish argument; but one astute, although not
unsympathetic, critic of Legrand states:
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A number of points could be made in reply to Legrand’s
objections to legal transplants. Much depends on the meaning
given to this term. Alan Watson for example uses his data
about transplants to refute Legrand’s claims about the
relationship between law and its context but is willing to
concede that a legal transplant cannot be expected to engineer a
determined solution but will take on a life of its own in its new
host.
Legrand may be battling with his own chosen
interpretation of the transplant metaphor. He also appears at
times to treat empirical claims as if they were logical ones—
and risks the contradictions of cultural relativism.279
Alan’s own response to Legrand is similar, and grounded in the documented
empirical claim “that massive successful borrowing is commonplace in law.”
In the face of Legrand’s arguments, he has reasserted that “borrowing is
usually the major factor in legal change,” and that legal borrowing is to be
equated with “legal transplants.”280
Much of Legrand’s argument against transplants arises from his
opposition to the calls for a European Civil Code.281 In the very different
context of the early 1970s, Alan had argued that the fact of transplants meant
that it should be possible “to frame a single basic code of private law to
operate throughout [the whole of the Western world].”282 When read in
1974, this will have seemed an interesting observation about an unlikely
eventuality; when a new edition appeared twenty years later, however, after
the call for codification of a European private law, it took on a different
appearance.283 Much effort has now been devoted to various projects of
harmonization or even unification of law in Europe.284 Hence Legrand’s
opposition to Alan’s idea of legal transplants: if transplants were easy, then it
would be easy to create and enforce a new European code of private law. Of
course, Alan would acknowledge the potential problems, but he would argue
that there are simply no technical problems in doing this, provided that there
was “a uniform system of adjudicating differences within a standard
279
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framework of the necessary sources of law.”285 He would add: “Authority is
paramount, because it alone can constitute the common element.”286
Gunther Teubner, best known as a system-theorist, intervened in this
debate in a much-cited and powerful article, focusing on attempts to unify
law within the European Union.
He saw Legrand as offering a
“contemporary reformulation of Montesquieu’s culturalist scepticism. . . .”287
He raised a number of theoretical difficulties and empirical observations
against Legrand’s work, also commenting (in 1998) that “Legrand’s still
rather modest efforts stand in somewhat strange contrast to the sweeping
claims of his general programme.”288 Teubner noted that Alan’s arguments
on transplants had foundations in rich and detailed historical evidence
showing that “transferring legal institutions between societies has been an
enormous historical success,” despite a “bewildering diversity of socioeconomic structures.”289 He summed up Alan’s claims thus:
He explains the success of legal transplants by a highly
developed autonomy of the modern legal profession. He
confronts functionalist comparativists with the theoretical
argument that convergence of socio-economic structures as
well as functional equivalence of legal institutions in fact do
not matter at all. Neither does — and this is his message to the
culturalists—the totality of a society’s culture.290
Teubner saw these claims as based on three arguments that he set out with a
careful evaluation of their strengths and weaknesses: “[C]omparative law
should no longer simply study foreign laws but study the interrelations
between different legal systems”;291 “[T]ransplants [are] the main source of
legal change”;292 and “[L]egal evolution takes place rather insulated from
social changes, that it tends to use the technique of ‘legal borrowing’ and can
be explained without reference to social, political, or economic factors.”293
Teubner was sympathetic to much that Alan had written, but saw Alan’s
285
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theorization as limited and in need of development. He argued that Alan
“seems to be obsessed with the somewhat sterile alternative of cultural
dependency versus legal insulation, of social context versus legal autonomy,
an obsession which he shares, of course, with his opponents.”294 Teubner
suggested that “legal transplant” was a misleading metaphor, and argued
engagingly for his own idea of “legal irritant.”295
In the context of the debates over law in Europe, there can be no doubt
but that Legrand’s very strongly phrased “culturalist” critique of Alan’s
theory helped considerably to spread and indeed to renew interest in legal
transplants; Teubner’s important contribution also stimulated reflection on
Alan’s work, and was reprinted in a leading collection on the legal effects of
European integration.296 Likewise, the developing debate over legal culture
in the 1990s also raised important questions about transplants; it also had to
take into account Alan’s own view of what legal culture was and how it had
a determining effect on legal change.297 Friedman has remained very
dismissive of Alan’s work on transplants; other scholars examining the
concept legal culture have not been so dismissive, and have continued to find
it necessary to address the theory of legal transplants.298 Alan’s narrower
focus on lawyers and legal elites generally has been viewed as highly
plausible, though inchoate as lacking detailed empirical historical study.299
One of the most significant scholars in promoting studies of legal culture
and comparative law since the mid-1990s is David Nelken, a sociologist of
law. In 1995, he organized a conference devoted to legal cultures at the
University of Macerata.300 Helping further spread interest was a series of
workshops held in the later 1990s at the International Institute for the
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Sociology of Law in Oñati. These generated a number of publications.301
One of the main organizers of these was Johannes Feest.302 From our point
of view most significant was the workshop “on piecemeal adaptation of legal
cultures,” organized at Oñati by Nelken and Feest.303 A central issue of the
workshop was legal transplants, and after some more theoretical discussions
of it, a number of papers were devoted to specific studies of legal borrowing
and adaptation.304 In the resulting book, Nelken summed up the discussion
of Watson’s and Ewald’s work, reflecting on transplants from the
perspectives provided by sociology.305 Chapters by Legrand, Cotterrell, and
Friedman have already been noticed here: the first presenting his usual
argument on the impossibility of transplants, the second assessing transplants
in the light of his ideas of community, and the third basically dismissing the
idea.306 Andrew Harding, however, in one of the empirical studies in the
volume, commented that “it seems as if Watson’s theory of legal
transplantation, according to South East Asian experience, is made out to a
remarkable extent . . . . [L]aw in South East Asia has evolved out of legal
transplantation, which has on the whole been successful.”307 While he
thought there might be particular local factors at play, he concluded:
[I]n broad terms the Watsonian thesis that the idea of a law can
be readily transplanted is, in relation to South East Asia, clearly
made out. The strictures of Montesquieu and Kahn-Freund do
not in general apply in South East Asia, and in fact their
theories are disproved by the South East Asian experience.
This is not the same as saying that all “repotting” of legal ideas
will result in instant blooms. South East Asia shows that,
under conditions of legal pluralism, absorption of legal ideas,
even imposed ones, takes place over time, slowly and even
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painfully. The evidence of successful legal transplants of
almost every conceivable kind is powerful.308
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth concluded their study of transplants, focusing
on developments in Central and South America by acknowledging that “[t]he
idea that legal transplants came from an autonomous group of elite lawyers, as
suggested by Alan Watson, is not implausible for this kind of process.”309 In a
study of debt, John Flood concluded that “[i]insolvency does, however,
demonstrate Watson’s thesis that comparative lawyers should study the
interrelations of legal systems rather than the operation of foreign laws.”310
By the end of the 1990s, the idea of legal culture was becoming a
commonly used analytical category in comparative law, along with notions
such as legal tradition, as scholars tried to get beyond simple positivism,
functionalism and concepts such as that of “legal family.”311 The debates
that had already developed thus meant that when a sociologist of law, such as
Roger Cotterrell, in reflecting on social theory and culture, turned to consider
comparative law, he inevitably discussed legal transplants.312 But the
concept of legal culture continued to be relied on and developed by
comparative lawyers in the new century.313 That there was sometimes seen
to be an incompatibility between culture and transplant must have made the
topic all the more compelling, raising potentially interesting theoretical
issues. Perhaps this led to the session on “Legal Culture and Legal
Transplants” (“La culture juridique et l’acculturation du droit”) at the
XVIIIth Congress of Comparative Law in 2010, held in Washington, D.C. It
is interesting to note, however, that the National Reports tended to assume
that the concept of legal culture was quite obvious and unproblematic, and
did not consider there to be any problems of the type identified by Grossfeld,
308
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Legrand, Nelken, or Friedman in relating it to legal transplants. This, of
course, may be the result of the questions put to the delegates; but no
difficulties were reported, and the concept of legal transplant drawn on by
the delegates was largely understood as that developed by Alan, used without
any questioning or indication that it might be debatable.314
Thus, though critics remain, by the end of the first decade of the twentyfirst century, the concept of legal transplant as developed and utilized by
Alan has become a standard way to approach comparative law. The
pressures of globalization and, within Europe, harmonization, have continued
to ensure its continuing relevance to debates on law.315 During the first
decade of the twenty-first century, a discussion in German added to the
already extensive discussions of transplants in other languages.316 In 2008, a
research group on “Histories of Common Law Legal Transplants” met in the
Institute for Advanced Studies in Jerusalem and a joint conference on the
theme was held at the Faculty of Law in Tel Aviv in June of that year.317
The papers were published in a special issue of a journal. Only one essay
was devoted to theoretical issues, and, in a sophisticated discussion, it
accepted the utility of the concept as offering a dynamic approach to
comparative law;318 but the other essays accepted legal transplants largely as
a simple given. The ultimate success of legal transplants as an approach to
comparative law is clear.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE PREHISTORY OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS
Mark Freedland, in his sensitive and touching evocation of the character
and scholarship of his Doktorvater, Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, writes that his

314
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mentor’s “most significant contribution to the general theory of comparative
law” was made in his Chorley Lecture of 1973:
It is here that he evokes and analyses “the problem of
transplantation.” The notion of “legal transplant” has become
so firmly part of the vocabulary of comparative legal studies
that it is now profoundly exciting to be reminded of its origin
in this lecture.
For Kahn-Freund, the “problem of
transplantation” was the inappropriateness of assuming that a
legal norm or structure which had been seen to work well in
one jurisdiction could be successfully introduced into another.
This he saw as the heeding and re-stating in a modern idiom of
Montesquieu’s warning that: Les lois politiques et civiles de
chaque nation . . . doivent être tellement propres au people pour
lequel elles sont faites, que c’est un grand hazard si celles
d’une nation peuvent convenir à un autre.”319
Of course, Kahn-Freund’s notion of “legal transplant” was indeed born in
that lecture on June 26, 1973; but as we have already seen the term or idea
was used almost contemporaneously—if not earlier—by Alan,320 by
Beckstrom,321 and by Rivero.322 As argued, the term was ripe for such
metaphoric usage in this period; there can be no surprise that these four
scholars adopted it at much the same time.
Indeed, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the term had been used earlier by
a number of British scholars.323 Thus in 1950, B.A. Wortley had reported
that the UNIDROIT conference in Rome had concluded that “the time was
[not] ripe for the transplanting of the Trust into other countries.”324 In 1955,
C.J. Hamson had noted that the Istanbul conference of the International
Committee of Comparative Law in 1955 had considered “the conditions and
circumstances under which a foreign system of law has in modern times been
received in a country having a cultural background and tradition different
319
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from that of the country in which the system originally developed.”325 He
noted that the Istanbul Conference was interested not so much in receptions
within Europe, but in those instances of reception where it was possible to
examine “the possibility and the effect of the transplantation of a system of
law into a significantly different culture.”326 Prominent examples of such
“transplantation” were “in those European colonies where the indigenous
populations remain the predominant cultural element.”327 The future of these
colonies “was likely to be of capital significance to our own civilization and
in that course the success or failure of the transplantation of a European
system of law will be a critical factor.”328
The modern scholar329 who first (as far as I have been able to trace) seems
to have used the metaphor of “transplant” or “transplantation” to explain
legal development was, however, the Scots advocate, Frederick P. Walton, in
1927. Born in England, Walton had studied classics at Oxford and law at
Edinburgh and Marburg, before being admitted as an advocate of the Scots
bar in 1886. In 1894, he was appointed Lecturer in Civil (i.e., Roman) Law
in the University of Glasgow and became Secretary to the Lord Advocate,
J.B. Balfour, the appointment ending in June 1895 when Balfour lost office
with the defeat of the Rosebery Government. He was next appointed
Professor of Roman Law and Dean of the Faculty of Law at the McGill
University in Montreal in 1897. He moved to Egypt in 1915 to become
Director of the Khedivial School of Law in Cairo in succession to Maurice
Sheldon Amos. He returned to Britain and settled in Oxford in the mid1920s. Sociable and hospitable, Walton was Secretary to the Law Club, a
dining club of academic lawyers in Oxford. Following the death of his wife
in 1932, he retired to Edinburgh, where he lived in Great King Street until
his own death.330 Walton’s grasp of the idea of legal transplantation
developed out of the experiences of his imperial academic career combined
with his training in Scots law and Roman law. In the later nineteenth
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century, Scots lawyers were coming to see their legal system as having a
“mixed and varied character.”331 This was because of its “large debt to the
jurisprudence of other countries, especially to the Roman and English
law.”332 In other words, Walton’s training as a Scots lawyer will have led
him to realize that law could be successfully imported and need not be
“indigenous.” His experiences of Quebec and Egypt will have reinforced
this view. In the former, he found another jurisdiction in which “the law
occupies a position midway between the Common law and the Civil law.”333
In 1913, he wrote that “the two countries whose legal systems present the
closest analogy to that of Quebec are Louisiana and Egypt.”334 This was
because of the shared background in French law and the influence in all three
of the French code. But he also recognized a similarity to Scotland.335
Walton was also alive to the significance of the historical relationships
between legal systems. While at McGill, he published for the law students
Historical Introduction to Roman Law, because, in “a country of the Civil
Law, like the Province of Quebec,” it was important “to show the way in
which the Roman Law has grown into the modern Civil Law.”336 He was
likewise alive to the relationship between the law of France and that of
Scotland, because they were “to a great extent derived from the same
sources,” though there was “little evidence” of “direct borrowing.”337 He
noted that Scotland had “long ceased to be a system of civil law in the same
sense as the law of France, Germany, or Italy,” since, “[l]ike the laws of
Lower Canada and of Louisiana, the Scots law has been profoundly modified
by contact with the English common law.”338 He nonetheless surveyed the
historical resemblances and differences explaining how they had come about.
In another study he had noted that:
[A] great part of the Common law of Scotland is still Roman
law, not more modified than the Heutiges Römisches Recht of
Germany or the Droit Civil of France. The law of obligations,
except where changed by legislation, or the law of servitudes,
is very much the same in Scotland as in France. Moreover
331
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Scotland has preserved the same technical phraseology. A
French lawyer, turning over a Scots law book, would be
astonished to meet at every turn terms with which he was
familiar. When the Civil Code of Lower Canada was being
prepared, the commissioners were sometimes hard put to it to
turn into English some term of the old French law. . . . By a
happy thought the commissioners turned to the Scots law and
found sometimes there the very words they wanted . . . .339
Walton’s experience of Egypt during the “Veiled Protectorate” would have
introduced him to a complex and plural system of courts and laws. “Mixed
Courts” had been introduced to deal with matters involving the substantial
foreign community; “Native Courts” dealt with matters exclusively involving
Egyptians. Mixed Courts had a bench consisting of Egyptian judges and
jurists from sixteen western countries. Similar codes, based on those of
France, but which also gave scope for equitable development, were employed
in both sets of courts.340 In particular, Walton made a significant study of the
Egyptian codes, publishing a major, two-volume comparative study of the
Egyptian law of obligations.341 A second edition appeared in 1923.342 Again,
he would have increased his knowledge of borrowing of laws.
Drawing on these experiences, Walton addressed the International
Academy of Comparative Law on August 1, 1927 on “The Historical School
of Jurisprudence and Transplantations of Law.”343 The address was
published as an article the same year, with the first part devoted to a
reassessment of F.C. von Savigny’s views on law, particularly as expressed
in his famous pamphlet of 1814, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung
und Rechtswissenschaft.344 He described Savigny’s view thus:
Savigny’s theory is that the law of any country grows up
naturally by customary usage and without legislation. It is a
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product of the peculiar genius of a particular people. It may be
compared with a language. The law of a people, like their
language, has an organic connexion with their peculiar being
and character.345
Savigny, according to Walton, saw the ancient customs of a nation as
“almost part of the blood and bone of a people.”346 He noted, however, that
“most unfortunately for Savigny’s theory, there was, besides this old
Gewohnheitsrecht, a great deal of German law which had not grown up in
this rather mysterious way.”347 As well as “plenty of enacted law . . . there
was also the great body of law—the so-called modern Roman law, or
Pandektenlehre—of which certainly it could not be said that it grew out of
German consciousness or that it reflected their peculiar national mind and
character.”348 To overcome this problem, Savigny argued that, at a certain
stage in the history of a nation, “a class of professional jurists arises.”349
This led to law developing in a different fashion. In Germany, however, the
lawyers “went back to Roman law, and devoted all their energies to
introduce a body of laws which had been evolved in a society profoundly
different from that of Germany.”350 The “fatal point” was that in Germany
this law was “of foreign origin.”351 Savigny’s “arguments in favour of
keeping inviolate laws which are the heritage of the race, and in which the
national character finds its expression . . . lose much of their force when we
face the facts.” Indeed:
The truth of the matter is that a very large part of the German
law did not grow out of the consciousness of the German
people, and does not bear the marks of their national genius,
but, on the other hand, it grew out of the consciousness of the
Roman people, and bears the stamp of the Roman mind.352
This meant that Savigny’s argument against codification in Germany—that
“it checks the natural and unconscious growth of law”353—is unfounded.
“Savigny’s famous theory did not square at all well with the facts of German
345
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law, and his arguments altogether failed to prevent the making of codes,
which has gone on merrily since his time.”354 Walton argued, however, that
Savigny was owed a great debt, as he had shown the importance of the study
of legal history, which, as a result of his endeavors, had advanced greatly in
the pasty fifty years in every European country.355
Walton thought that Savigny would have been “shocked . . . profoundly”
by some recent events of “an entirely novel character.”356 He thinks it “a
new phenomenon in the legal world.”357 This was when “a people
possessing an ancient customary law, which had grown up ages ago out of
their legal consciousness, has deliberately thrown overboard this heritage of
the race, and has introduced at one blow a legal system entirely foreign.”358
He described this as “Transplantation of a Legal System.”359 This was not
the imposition by a conqueror of his laws on a conquered race, nor was it
“the case of one country copying a particular rule or a particular piece of
legislation which has been found to work well in another place,” which “kind
of legislative borrowing is much commoner than it used to be.”360 Rather,
the examples he was thinking of were the “transplantations of a legal system,
or a large part of a legal system, from one country to another.”361 In
particular he was considering where:
[W]e see an oriental country with a system of law of great
antiquity, and, moreover, a system of law which is closely
bound up with the national religion, casting all, or a great part
of this old law away, and adopting the law of a western people,
far removed in race, religion, history and culture. And yet this
has happened in our time in Egypt, in Japan and in Turkey.362
He then discussed briefly these examples of what he had called
“transplantation.”363 He expressed the view that “the foreign law which has
been so violently introduced will serve the needs of the people just as well as
if it had grown out of their own legal consciousness.”364
354
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Walton has confined the term “transplantation” to full-scale modern
transplants; but it is worth noting that he thinks borrowing of rules common,
perhaps even easy.365 Indeed, how could he think otherwise given his
experience and his studies of codification? He had already written in 1916
that “[c]odifiers are arrant thieves, and every new civil code ought to contain
some articles which the legislators of other countries will make up their
minds to steal so soon as a favorable opportunity occurs.”366 In an
assessment of the law of Czechoslavakia, as represented in a recently
produced volume, he remarked in 1934, using an interesting horticultural
metaphor, that it showed that “new laws, very modern in spirit, have been
grafted on the old stocks of Austrian law and Hungarian law.”367 In the same
paper, however, he was fascinated with a volume on Romania, but he
regretted that the authors had passed “very lightly over what is to a foreign
student the most interesting question, namely how the French law has
flourished in Rumania [sic] after it was transplanted there.”368 The adoption
of French law in Romania started in 1839 with the Code of Commerce; in
1864, the Civil Code followed. All of this modernized the law and social
practices.369 It is clear that he thought this full-scale type of transplantation
must have been difficult; but his only evidence was a highly romanticized
remark about the “Rumanian [sic] soul” being absent from the code.370
With his observations about the frequency of borrowing of legislation and
his discussions of full-scale transplants, such as those in Romania, Turkey,
Japan, and Egypt, Walton is approaching Alan’s theory of transplants; but he
does not quite get there. He was not willing to put the whole package
together. He thought borrowing modern; but this was because he did not
seem to think of the reception of Roman law as being about borrowing. He
saw some types of borrowing as easy; but he assumed that major transplants,
as in Romania, were not easy. He did not see the taking of European law to
the colonies as involving transplantation; only the substitution of one
sophisticated law system for another was viewed as such. Perhaps all of this
was because he focused too much on legislative borrowing. He did not
recognize that there must be significant implications for our understanding of
law and its development. But the metaphor and the ideas were there.
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Indeed, the metaphor was then taken up and perhaps extended by other
comparative lawyers. In 1930, R.W. Lee, another British comparative lawyer
with an imperial career, deployed it to take into account European law taken to
a colony when he talked of Roman-Dutch law as “a body of laws transplanted
from its native land to distant dependencies overseas.”371 Interestingly enough,
he drew a comparison with the friend who had gone to the colonies, been lost
sight of, and returns: much is changed, but some things have remained the
same.372 But he noted that Roman-Dutch law had “borrowed from [English
law] much that has helped it to adapt itself to a new age, much too that
harmonizes imperfectly with what was there before”:373 remarks that
potentially fit with the ideas of Legal Transplants. In 1937, Hermann
Mannheim, a German refugee of Jewish descent, published a study of the use
of the jury in criminal trials in continental Europe, which he described as a
“transplantation” from England; he also used the verb “to transplant,”
discussing a statute.374 Henri Lévy Ullmann, a friend of Walton, referred to his
usage of transplantation in discussing Turkey in 1939.375 This, of course, leads
to the use by Wortley and Hamson already noted for the 1950s.
Given the common usage of the metaphor of “transplant” in many types
of situation, it would be very odd if there were no other scattered examples
of the employment of the term in this period to refer to the adoption of rules
or procedures from another legal system; and it is easy indeed to discover
these with a simple word-search in a data base.376 But Walton’s discussion

371
R.W. Lee, What Has Become of Roman-Dutch Law?, 12 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 3d
ser. 33, 33 (1930).
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Id.
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Id. at 42. For more information on R.W. Lee, see Tony Honoré, Lee, Robert Warden
(1868–1958), OXFORD DICTIONARY NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/artic
le/34469?docPos=2 (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
374
Hermann Mannheim, Trial by Jury in Modern Continental Criminal Law, 53 L.Q. REV.
99, 99, 116 (1937); Hermann Mannheim, Trial by Jury in Modern Continental Criminal Law
[Part II], 53 L.Q. REV. 388, 391 (1937); see also Roger Hood, Hermann Mannheim (1879–
1974) and Max Grünhut (1893–1964), in JURISTS UPROOTED: GERMAN-SPEAKING ÉMIGRÉ
LAWYERS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN, supra note 319, at 709 passim (providing
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cannot fairly transplant it from one to the other. . . .”); William R. Vance, A Proposed Court
of Conciliation, 1 MINN. L. REV. 107, 110 (1917) (“[T]o transplant to American soil this
European exotic. . . .”); Eki Hioki, A General Survey of the Judicial System of Japan, 10
CHINESE SOC. & POL. SCI. REV. 581 (1926) (“[A] very difficult task to transplant Occidental
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Actions of Attachment in the City of St. Louis, 14 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 25, 31 (1928) (“[B]y
transplanting the provision of Section 2838 . . . into the city of St. Louis.”); Thomas D.
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of “transplantation” is still unique and important. He has taken the term as
providing a metaphor with which we can understand a legal phenomenon,
and given it significant explanatory power, just in the way Alan was to do in
the early 1970s for “legal transplants.” Of course, Walton has not worked
the idea out so fully as Alan did half a century later; nor would his views and
Alan’s be at one on all points. Moreover, Walton’s metaphor was
presumably horticultural rather than surgical. But the similarities are still
striking: borrowing is playing a central part in legal development; the culture
of lawyers is central to the legal system and the adoption of rules; law is not
closely linked with society in a necessary fashion (even if Walton’s target
was Savigny’s idea of law as an expression of the Volksgeist).
Some classic cases of transplants and receptions, as singled out by
Michele Graziadei, include: the reception of Roman law; the diffusion of
some civil codes; diffusion of the common law; and mixed legal systems.377
Walton, like Watson, was interested in all of these. Both men also discussed
to some extent, if in differing ways, the factors Graziadei identifies as
significant in promoting receptions and transplants.378 Both recognized that
“transplants can be unsettling to those who believe law must reflect the
culture and mores of a particular society.”379
What is interesting is the way Walton’s interests were later echoed by those
of Alan: Roman law, Scots law, codifications, and mixed legal systems. This
suggests that to have been educated in a legal system like Scotland’s that is not
a dominant one—and which cannot trace or rely on claims (even if pretended)
of immemorial antiquity—may well help a scholar to develop a predisposition
to accept the idea of transplants. Just as the idea of legal transplants obviously
makes sense as a theory to many Italian and Israeli scholars, so it will resonate
powerfully for Scots lawyers, such as Alan and Walton, since their legal
system has quite evidently borrowed much. Scots lawyers cannot see Scots
law as an intellectual system closed off from the influence of other laws, and
whose development can be made subject to a narrow explanation solely in
terms of Scottish politics, economics and society. Such a limited set of
explanations will make no sense.
By 2013, the forty years of history of legal transplants has led the theory
from a position of being either largely ignored or rejected to one of being
generally accepted—often enthusiastically—as a standard approach to
comparative law—indeed one judged worth developing further. The same
Thacher, Aid Asked in Bankruptcy Investigation, 16 A.B.A.J. 641, 643 (1930) (“[W]e cannot
transplant the English statute.”). Others can be traced.
377
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378
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forty years have correspondingly seen Alan’s book, Legal Transplants, turn
from an often harshly criticized work into a classic of comparative law.
Frederick Walton is a minor figure, now largely forgotten, except for a few
scholars of the history of comparative law. One suspects that, after the
Second World War, with the end of the British Empire, and the stimulus it
had very definitely given to the study of comparative law in Great Britain,
his type of global thinking about law and his type of experience of a wider
world ended. By 1970, however, the world was opening again; broader
perspectives allowed connections that had fallen from sight to be seen once
more. A scholar with broadly similar interests to those of Walton, with a
similarly extensive and detailed knowledge of the legal history of a whole
variety of societies, could again see that there must be something very
significant about borrowing, both historical borrowing and borrowing
between contemporary jurisdictions, and thus about the transplantation of
laws, whether the transplant was major or small. The idea of legal
transplants was at some level the same as the now forgotten usage of fifty
years earlier. But scientific developments meant the metaphor took on a new
coloring and could be extended in different ways, a means was offered to
explain much through the organization and imagery provided by the
“transplant” metaphor; and so it was that Legal Transplants: An Approach to
Comparative Law came to be written.

